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Introduction
This publication presents the 
French case study of the European 
ENCI-LowCarb research project: 
Engaging Civil Society in Low 
Carbon scenarios1.
the energy scenarios presented in this re-port do not reflect the views of cIRed or 
RAc. The “acceptable” scenario derives from the 
outcome of the stakeholders’ group discussions, 
without necessarily representing the vision of any 
individual stakeholder. In addition, further ana-
lyzes carried out depart from the “acceptable” 
scenario to explore uncertainties and possible 
measures to reach ambitious mitigation targets.
The analyses contained in this report are based 
on the results of modeling exercises carried out 
with the Imaclim-R France model, which is desig-
ned to provide a coherent picture of energy and 
economy at a medium and long-term horizon. The 
various scenarios considered in this document 
represent coherent technico-economic pathways 
resulting from technical, economic and behavioral 
assumptions incorporated in the Imaclim-R France 
framework after discussions with stakeholders 
and sectoral experts. In such a modeling approach, 
the quantitative figures given as model outcomes 
have no predictive value, but serve as a basis for 
characterizing and revealing the major mecha-
nisms at play in the complex dynamic system 
made of several economic sectors and agents 
linked by multiple socio-economic interactions.
the core activity of the ENCI-LowCarb project was the development of a methodology for the 
transparent integration of stakeholders’ contribu-
tions in the scenario design process to enhance the 
stakeholders’ acceptance of the resulting low car-
bon pathways. This attempt at integrating accepta-
bility in scenario-making constitutes an important 
step to assess what is acceptable, beyond what 
is technically and economically feasible. Today, a 
wide range of published scenarios emphasize the 
fact that they are built on public consultations or 
stakeholders’ contributions. However, transparency 
lacks concerning the methodology relative to how 
contributions were taken into account and trans-
lated into assumptions that can be used by the 
modeling tool. The ENCI-LowCarb project aimed 
at exploring this scientific gap.
Energy scenarios outline possible low-carbon 
futures built around assumptions on fossil fuels 
prices evolution, technological choices and the 
mechanisms of energy demand and supply, among 
others. Scenarios are influential tools in political 
decision-making processes since they shed light 
on the long-term impacts of today’s investment 
decisions, especially regarding infrastructures. This 
is why it is crucial that these pathways derive from 
discussions with main stakeholders.
In this report, the French project team (CIRED 
and RAC-F) has the pleasure to present CO2 
emissions reductions scenarios for France which 
derive from a collaborative scenario design pro-
cess including the participation of a wide range of 
French stakeholders (civil society organizations 
including trade unions and non-governmental 
organizations, private companies, banks, sta-
tewide and local authorities). 
Participating stakeholders were asked to define 
or select acceptable CO2 emissions mitigation 
measures. Their contributions were implemented 
in the technico-economic model Imaclim-R 
France to create a scenario that is economically 
and technically consistent as well as acceptable 
by stakeholders. This methodology allowed an 
assessment of the level of achievable emissions 
reductions with measures deemed acceptable 
by stakeholders.
This project report is organized as follows: part 2 
presents the methodology of the collaborative 
scenario design process in detail, part 3 describes 
the low carbon scenario which is the outcome 
of the stakeholder discussions. In part 4, other 
drivers of CO2 emissions and additional measures 
are explored. Chapter 5 introduces additional 
sensitivity analyses. part 6 concludes.
1- The project (April 2009 
– March 2012) was funded 
by the 7th Framework 
Program for research of 
the European Commis-
sion. The project team 
consisted of two research 
institutes – CIRED and 
PIK – as well as three 
NGOs – RAC-France (coor-
dinator), Germanwatch 
and INFORSE-Europe.  
More information on the 
project:  
www.enci-lowcarb.eu
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Methodology: 
steps towards a “collaborative 
scenario design” 
I. the need for involving 
stakeholders 
Many energy scenarios are based on public or stakeholders consultations. However, few 
attribute importance to the scenario design process 
and explain in a transparent way how contributions 
are taken into account and integrated in a modeling 
tool, that is to say how the translation process was 
carried out from an idea supported by contributors 
to its representation in the modeling tool.
A first question one might ask is: “Why is stake-
holder involvement important when discussing 
energy scenarios?” First, most stakeholders can 
provide additional expertise to the technical and 
economic hypotheses as well as initiate discussions 
around sensitive issues. Second, the exchanges 
with stakeholders bring to light the main cleavages 
and obstacles to reaching a decarbonized society. 
Thus, the dialogue can lead to finding a common 
ground for possible solutions and outlining a robust 
strategy. Finally, consultation with stakeholders 
enhances the ownership of the created scenarios 
by the stakeholders. 
In conclusion, there are many reasons why stake-
holders should be consulted and if possible acti-
vely integrated in the scenario-making process. 
Today, the challenge is to avoid limiting the in-
fluence of stakeholders to a non-interactive com-
munication (as in the case of online consultations). 
If scenarios aim at representing the contributions 
of stakeholders, a deeper thought has to be given 
to the design of the process to make it interac-
tive. Gathering people for multi-stakeholder dis-
cussions, collecting their contributions and then 
elaborating the scenario behind closed doors can 
be a source of disengagement for participating 
stakeholders.
Therefore, the innovation of the ENCI-LowCarb 
project resides less in the resulting energy sce-
narios than in the process itself. The project hy-
pothesis consisted in stating that if national stake-
holders can recognize their contributions in the 
resulting scenarios (even if those were amended 
by the contributions of others), they would even-
tually be more supportive of this scenario than in 
a case where a non-transparent procedure was 
followed. Using collaborative procedures can 
increase stakeholders’ acceptance and generate 
political support for energy scenarios and the 
resulting policy measures. Reaching this posi-
tive outcome also implies more involvement for 
both stakeholders and modelers – particularly in 
terms of time and shared understanding of the 
issues at stake and of the functioning of the used 
modeling tool.
A transparent stakeholder consultation process 
requires the existence of a common ground: model 
parameters and input variables of the model have 
to be carefully translated into tangible, real-life, 
implications which stakeholders can assess. The 
considerations emerging from the stakeholder 
consultation can then be translated back into tech-
nical model parameters, i.e. political framework 
conditions, which will result in different low carbon 
energy system scenarios. This “translation work” 
is necessary to work with such modeling tools and 
needs a considerable effort of communication to 
avoid the feeling that all contributions enter a 
black box without any traceability.
the modeling work of this project followed two 
main principles:
* Acceptance: Reaching a maximum degree of 
stakeholders’ acceptance.
* Realism: Satisfying technical and economic 
limits. 
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Within the ENCI-LowCarb project, one challenge 
was the use of macro-economic hybrid models 
for the scenario design task (IMACLIM-R France 
for France3 and REMIND-D for Germany4), which 
are often characterized as “black-boxes”5. This 
implies at least a basic introduction to the Ima-
clim-R France model dynamics: What are the main 
mechanisms? What is the degree of detail of the 
sectoral representation? What are exogenous and 
endogenous variables? etc). The form of the mode-
ling tool indeed shapes the form of the dialogue. 
social acceptance  
or stakeholders’ acceptance?
Within the frame of the ENCI-LowCarb pro-
ject it was not possible to evaluate “social 
acceptance”, and the focus was rather on 
“stakeholders’ acceptance”. Social accep-
tance has different aspects that cannot be 
assessed with the available project tools. 
In the context of energy system strategies, 
social acceptance has three dimensions 
(Wüstenhagen 2007)2: (i) socio-political 
acceptance, referring to the acceptance 
of technologies and policies by the public, 
key stakeholders and policy-makers, (ii) 
community acceptance of site-specific 
local projects and (iii) market acceptance, 
referring to the process of the adoption 
by consumers and investors of innova-
tive low-emission products. Community 
acceptance is a highly important topic 
concerning the building of new energy 
infrastructure (electricity grid, windmills, 
nuclear waste deposals etc.) but it cannot 
be directly represented in a modeling tool 
with no spatial dimension.
II. the IMAclIM-R France 
modeling tool
Imaclim-R France
6 is a computable general equi-
librium model. This model was used for the 
collaborative scenario design process of French 
energy scenarios within the project ENCI-LowCarb. 
It models the evolution of the French economy split 
into 15 sectors: energy sectors (crude oil, refined 
oil, gas, coal, and electricity), transport sectors 
(freight terrestrial transport, water transport, air 
transport, public road passenger transports, and 
rail passenger transport), construction, energy-
intensive industries, agriculture and services.
The Imaclim-R France model computes, between 
2004 and 2050, the evolution of the economy 
and the energy system with a strong consistency. 
This is why Imaclim-R France is what is called a 
hybrid model compared to economic models or to 
technical models. The first type of models focuses 
on economic dynamics but includes a weak repre-
sentation of the energy system. The second type 
of models focuses on technologies and energy but 
has a poor representation of economic constraints 
and dynamics (particularly the interaction between 
prices and demand for energy and commodities).
In Imaclim-R France, energy is explicitly repre-
sented both in values and physical quantities so 
as to capture the specific role of energy sectors 
and their interaction with the rest of the economy. 
The existence of explicit physical variables (e.g. 
number of cars, number of dwellings or energy 
efficiency of technologies) allows a rigorous incor-
poration of sector-based information about how 
final demand and technical systems are transfor-
med by economic incentives. In Imaclim-R France, 
each year the equilibrium provides a snapshot 
of the economy and gives GDP, sectoral prices, 
sectoral investments, households consumption in 
2- Wüstenhagen R, Wol-
sink, M, Bürer MJ 2007, 
‘Social acceptance of 
renewable energy inno-
vation: An introduction 
to the concept’, Energy 
Policy, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 
2683-2691.
3- www.imaclim.
centre-cired.fr/spip.
php?article129&lang=env 
4- www.pik-potsdam.de/
research/sustainable-so-
lutions/models/remind
5- Sandrine Mathy, 
Meike Fink, Ruben Bibas 
(2011): “Quel rôle pour les 
scénarios Facteur 4 dans 
la construction de la déci-
sion publique ?”, Revue 
Développement Durable 
et Territoires, Numéro 
Spécial sur le Facteur 4 ; 
Vol. 2, n° 1 | Mars 2011: 
http://developpementdu-
rable.revues.org/8802
6- Imaclim-R France 
is part of the Imaclim 
models family developed 
by the CIRED.
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each sector, unemployment rate and international 
trade. Two successive annual equilibria are linked 
by “dynamic sectoral modules” such as an elec-
tricity module, a residential module, etc. These 
sectoral modules represent the specific sector 
dynamics given economic constraints (including 
available investment in the sector, intermediate 
consumptions and energy prices) and physical 
constraints (e.g. inertia in technological infras-
tructures and appliances limiting the extent of 
energy efficiency).
Imaclim-R France is an open economy model. 
Thus, an important modeling assumption is that 
crude oil, gas and coal prices are exogenous, 
they are calibrated on the World Energy Outlook 
report by the International Energy Agency (2011). 
A limitation of Imaclim-R France is that it com-
putes only energy-related CO2 emissions. Other 
greenhouse gases are not represented.
The collaborative scenario design process relies 
on Imaclim-R France for integrating all the inputs 
from stakeholders. Therefore, the modeling tool 
strongly determines the form of the interaction 
with stakeholders, the format of the meetings as 
well as the manner to discuss the issues. Indeed, 
the fact that Imaclim-R France is built recursively 
with dynamic sectoral modules prompted us to 
organize sectoral experts’ meetings first, then sec-
toral stakeholders meetings so as to embrace the 
vastness of debates when decarbonizing triggers 
a structural transformation of the sector. Then, 
with all the richness of the debate embarked in 
the model, a step back was taken to look at the 
interactions between all the different sectors in 
a cross-sectoral feedback seminar. The following 
part describes this process in more details. 
III. description of the collabora-
tive scenario design process
the collaborative scenario design process deve-loped within the project was divided in several 
steps:
1.  Organization of experts’ meetings.
2.  Stakeholder mapping: Identification of national 
stakeholders.
3.  Organization of sectoral stakeholders’ meetings
4.  Translation of stakeholders’ contributions into 
model parameters.
5. Organization of a cross-sectoral feedback seminar.
1. expert meetings
In order to assess the degree of economic and 
technical realism of the modeling tool, experts’ 
meetings were organized in order to correct and 
update exogenous hypotheses (costs, potentials, 
investments, learning curves etc.) as well as the 
dynamics of the model itself: investments in the 
electricity sector or the dynamics of the residential 
1 - Imaclim-R France model dynamics
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sector. Experts’ meetings were organised concer-
ning the residential, transport and power sector.
2. stakeholders’ mapping - Identification of 
the national stakeholders
In order to select and to invite the stakeholders 
that play an essential role in the energy sectors at 
stake (residential, transport, electricity), we adop-
ted the methodology of a stakeholders’ mapping 
via a “power-interest-grid”. Based on this analysis, 
main stakeholders were identified and a contact 
list was established.
“Power versus interest grids typically help deter-
mine which players’ interests and power bases 
must be taken into account in order to address 
the problem or issue at hand.”7 
The aim of the ENCI-LowCarb Project was to select 
mainly the stakeholders situated in the quadrants 
to the right: “Key-Players” and “Show considera-
tion”. As the evaluation concerning the “interest 
and influence” of specific actors is highly personal, 
2 - collaborative scenarios creation process
the interviews were repeated with at least three 
different experts of the concerned sector in order 
to crosscheck the evaluations.
structure of the interviews:
I.  Discussion on the main sector specific challenges. 
II.  Creation of a list of actors, development of a 
typology of those actors (private companies, 
ministries, associations, trade unions, banks…).
III.  Mapping of the identified actors on the power-
interest grid.
3. organization of sectoral stakeholders’ 
meetings to assess measures’ acceptability
In order to create scenarios with a high degree of 
“stakeholder acceptance” the project team ENCI-
LowCarb invited the selected representatives of 
national stakeholder organizations to sector-spe-
cific meetings (transport, residential, electricity 
etc.). During these meetings, stakeholders could 
express their vision on the evolution of technology 
choices, policy measures and economic incentives 
necessary and acceptable to reduce CO2 emissions. 
The meetings were recorded to collect a maximum 
of usable information ; all stakeholders answered 
a questionnaire and minutes were taken from the 
ongoing discussions.
It was decided to limit the number of stakeholder 
to 15 to foster in-depth discussions.
the meetings were divided in three steps: 
1. Presentation of the project methodology. 
2.  Gathering input concerning the main sector 
specific topics.
3.  Detailed presentation of several selected subjects 
and discussion with the invited stakeholders.
A questionnaire was developed for each of the 
subjects under point three, and energy scenarios 
were modeled based on the answers of the stake-
holders to these questionnaires and the content 
of the ongoing, moderated discussions. 
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of technical 
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7- Bryson, J. 
(1995) Strategic 
Planning for Public 
and Nonprofit 
Organizations, 
San Francisco, CA: 
Jossey- Bass.
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4. translation of stakeholders contributions 
in modeling parameters
Between the evaluation of the contributions of 
stakeholders and the modeling exercise, an impor-
tant step was the translation of the stakeholder 
visions into model parameters. 
The information gathered within the sector specific 
stakeholder meetings was translated by the project 
team into model parameters and added together 
to a first version of the “acceptable mitigation sce-
nario”. Points of disagreement were laid open and 
handled by the development of scenario variants.
5. organization of a cross-sectoral feedback 
seminar
As the first round of stakeholder meetings was 
sector-specific, the second one was cross-sectoral 
to overcome the artificial separation of energy 
system related questions between sectors. It is dif-
ficult to overlook the interactions between trans-
port and residential choices concerning topics like 
“urban sprawl” or electricity and housing related 
issues considering the question of electric hea-
ting. However, it was important to break down the 
energy system in “sub-sectors” in the beginning 
to define clear visions and policies. 
The main objective of the cross-sectoral meeting 
was to get a feedback on the first version of the 
“acceptable mitigation scenario”. The stakehol-
ders’ comments were then incorporated into the 
model. Points of disagreement arising from the 
evaluation of the outcomes of the first meetings 
were presented in the form of scenario variants.
The emissions reductions in the scenario only 
based on policy measures that are acceptable in 
the eyes of at least half of the stakeholders are 
too low to achieve neither the necessary reduction 
consistent with the recommendations of the IPPC 
nor the French objective for 2050 – a reduction 
about -75% of the emissions compared to 1990.
Indeed, the policy measures that were judged 
acceptable only achieve a 68% CO2 emissions 
reduction compared to 1990. 
Within the ENCI-LowCarb project, we decided to 
present in a transparent manner additional mea-
sures (section 4) that were not considered accep-
table by a majority of the stakeholders but which 
are necessary to achieve ambitious climate targets. 
These measures need further political discussion.
example of the translation process : residential sector – refurbishment 
One of the main obstacles for the refurbishment of houses identified by the stakeholders is the still predominant 
aversion of homeowners to refurbish their houses or apartments even if many financial incentives exist. The aver-
sion is even higher if one is non-occupying homeowner. A barrier for owners is that the access to tax incentives 
and subsidies is conditioned to a high personal financial contribution. Even the access to a zero-interest loan is 
difficult without collaterals. The stakeholders recommended solutions to overcome this barrier: the creation of an 
obligatory refurbishment fund for jointly-owned buildings and long-term third-party financing. As these solutions 
cannot be integrated one-to-one into the modeling tool, alternative modeling strategies had to be developed. For 
instance it is possible within the Imaclim-R France tool to change the specific “risk-aversion level” of the different 
agents (occupying and non-occupying homeowners etc.).
8 
3An acceptable 
low carbon 
scenario for 
France
Introduction 
the scenario detailed over the following pages was elaborated with the specific collaborative approach, which is explained in part 2. The 
technical, economic and political variables that served as input for the 
scenario were directly defined by the stakeholders in collaboration with 
the modeling team.
The focus of the project was to evaluate “stakeholder acceptance” rather 
than “social acceptance” in the broader sense. Indeed, social acceptance 
goes beyond the project approach as it includes for example the dimen-
sion of “local acceptance” and would require a much broader sample of 
participating stakeholders and even of individual citizens.
The developed scenario presents a set of policy measures and technical 
variables that were deemed “acceptable” by a majority of the selected 
stakeholders. The presentation of different elements of the scenario is 
divided in the following subchapters: residential sector, transport sector, 
industry and services sector, electricity sector and macroeconomic ana-
lysis. The presentation then provides an analysis of emissions reductions 
determinants and concludes with an overview on the ambition of the 
energy scenario in terms of CO2 emissions reductions.
9 
4 -  composition of the residential final energy 
consumption - 2010
5 -  Final energy mix for heating in the residential sector – 2010
Heating
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I. overview
In 2009, the residential sector emitted 16% of the overall CO2 emissions – this share has remained 
approximately stable since 1990. However, the 
emissions of the residential sector increased about 
15% in absolute terms. This number reaches 22% 
if the emissions from electricity production and 
district heating are included (those are generally 
counted under “energy industry”).
In 2010, the residential sector was responsible for 
30% of the final energy consumption. In compari-
son to 1973, the consumption has increased about 
25%, but has remained stable since 2000. The 
main energy consuming service is heating with 
65% of the final energy consumption.
Approximately 30% of all dwellings correspond to 
the energy efficiency class D. Less than 1% satis-
fies the criteria for class A and hardly more 3% 
achieve class B.
The most important energy sources used for heating are 
gas and electricity, providing 76% of heating for the building 
stock. Fuel and wood are mostly used in individual housing 
whereas district heating concerns almost exclusively apart-
ment buildings.
The residential sector in France consists of 32.6 million dwellings, 
6% of them being vacant and 10% of them being secondary resi-
dencies. 57% are individual houses and 43% apartment buildings. 
Nearly 60% of the overall building stock has been constructed 
before the adoption of the first thermal regulation in 1975.
The slow rhythm of destructions (about 20 000 to 
30 000 each year) explains the long lifetime of the 
existing building stock. New constructions mainly 
contribute to the growth of the building stock and 
to the replacement of demolished buildings. 
How to increase the performance and rate of refur-
bishment is the main challenge for climate and 
energy policies within this sector since two thirds 
of the residential stock which will exist in 2050 are 
already built!
climate & energy objectives:
The French legislation sets several objectives for 
the residential sector:
* A 38% reduction of the primary energy consump-
tion of the residential sector before 2020. 
* A 40% reduction of the primary energy consump-
tion of public buildings before 2020.
* Refurbishment of all social housing dwellings 
having an energy consumption higher than 230 
kWh primary energy/m2/year before 2020.
* From 2013, an annual refurbishment rate of about 
400.000 dwellings.
Residential sector
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6 -  Building stock composition, primary residences in 2007 
According to building type and energy label
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II.  Representation of the 
residential sector in 
Imaclim-R France
this section gives a short description of the representation of the residential sector in the 
modeling tool Imaclim-R France.
1.  technological representation of the 
building stock
Imaclim-R France describes the dynamics of the 
French household sector through the construction 
of new buildings and the retrofitting of the existing 
ones. Only primary residences are considered here 
and auxiliary heating appliances are not taken 
into account (e.g. auxiliary electric heating and 
firewood for fireplaces). The residential building 
stock is disaggregated by energy carrier (electricity, 
gas, fuel oil, wood) ; by energy class, as labeled 
by the French energy performance certificate, 
from A (50kWh/m2/year of primary energy) to G 
(over 450 kWh/m2/year of primary energy) ; and 
by agents and typology of housing (occupying or 
non-occupying homeowners of individual or col-
lective dwellings and social housing). No explicit 
technologies are represented. Therefore, implicit 
packages of measures on the envelope (insulation, 
double glazing) and the heating system reach the 
various levels of thermal performance. Each year, 
population growth, increased surface per person 
and the compensation of some building demoli-
tion create a demand for new constructions. The 
performance of the buildings constructed from 
2008 onwards is split into three categories: the 
2005 thermal regulation level (from 120 to 250 
kWh/m2/year of primary energy, depending on the 
local climate), starting from 2012 low consumption 
buildings (50 kWh/m2/year) and zero-energy buil-
dings after 2020, which produce at least as much 
energy with renewable sources as they consume 
with energy-efficient appliances.
2. drivers of energy savings
In existing buildings, energy efficiency improve-
ments result from investments to upgrade existing 
dwellings to upper energy classes (e.g. transitioning 
from G to F… until A ; from F to E… until A), as well as 
from fuel switch. These transitions depend on the 
GEC FDBA
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lifecycle cost of each option, including investment 
costs and lifetime-discounted energy operating 
expenditures. Heterogeneous discount rates are 
used to account for the “landlord-tenant dilemma”, 
which splits incentives between five types of inves-
tors: occupying or non-occupying homeowners of 
individual or collective dwellings, in addition to 
social housing. Imperfect information is accounted 
for through the calibration of “intangible costs”. 
The intangible costs add to the overall costs when 
the agent takes the investment decision but are 
not paid when actually refurbishing. They thus fill 
the gap between observed technology choices 
and choices that would be made under perfect 
information, by estimating the monetary value 
of this gap. The gap is narrowed in the long-term 
by a decreasing function of intangible costs with 
cumulative knowledge, representing information 
acceleration or the “neighborhood effect”. Overall, 
energy efficiency improvements (i.e. increased 
quantity and/or quality of retrofits) are derived 
from changes in the relative profitability of various 
retrofitting options, induced by energy price in-
crease and sustained by retrofitting cost decrease.
III.  Acceptable policy measures 
in the residential sector
1. tax credits
The purchase of refurbishment equipments, which 
increase energy efficiency like double-glazing, insu-
lation, efficient boilers or heat pumps, is eligible 
to income tax credits. The rates range from 15 to 
50% of investment costs. Increased rates and an 
extended eligibility base compared to the subsidy 
scheme prior to 2012 are modeled from 2009 until 
2050 through a uniform tax rebate of 30% of the 
investment. Tax credit for all transitions to upper 
energy classes are capped at 8,000€ per dwelling.
2. Zero-interest loans for retrofitting actions
0% interest loan apply for retrofit packages with 
a maximum amount at 30,000€ per dwelling. The 
credit duration period is about 10 years for indivi-
dual houses, and 15 years for social housing and 
collective dwellings.
3. progressive tariff
This measure aims at reducing electricity consump-
tion by increasing the prices above a fixed base 
consumption. In the scenario the progressive tariff 
is applied on all household electricity consumption. 
For all households, any consumption above 60 
kWh/m2 is paid at an augmented tariff. The prices 
per additional kWh increase by 5% after 2014 in 
case the consumption exceeds this limit and by 
10% after 2030.
4. Biogas
The biogas penetrates gradually between 2012 and 
2050. Its share reaches 17% (3 Mtoe) of total the 
gas consumption in 2050.
5. thermal regulation for new buildings
From 2012, new constructions respect a maximum 
primary energy consumption level about 50 kWh/
m2/year of primary energy. After 2020, the stan-
dard increases: new buildings have to be net pro-
ducers of energy.
6. carbon tax
A carbon tax gives a price signal to reduce highly 
carbonized energy consumptions and to shift the 
energy production system to low carbon technolo-
gies. The carbon tax used in the project scenario is 
equal to 32€/tCO2 in 2012, increasing gradually to 
56€/tCO2 in 2020, to 100€/tCO2 in 2030, to 200€/
tCO2 in 2040 and to 300€/tCO2 in 2050. In this 
scenario, the carbon tax income is given back to 
households through lump-sum transfers.
One of the main obstacles for the refurbishment 
of houses identified by the stakeholders is the still 
predominant aversion of homeowners to refurbish 
their houses or apartments even if many financial 
incentives exist. The aversion is even higher if one 
is only tenant. A barrier for owners is that the 
access to tax incentives and subsidies is conditio-
ned to a high personal financial contribution. Even 
the access to a zero-interest loan is difficult without 
collaterals. The stakeholders recommended solu-
tions to overcome this barrier: the creation of an 
obligatory refurbishment fund for jointly-owned 
buildings and a long-term third party financing. 
As these solutions cannot be integrated one-to-
one into the modeling tool, alternative modeling 
strategies had to be developed. For instance it is 
possible within the Imaclim-R tool to change the 
specific “risk-aversion level” of the different agents 
(house owners, occupying and non-occupying 
homeowners etc.).
The refurbishment obligation when changing occu-
pants did not reach consensus of the majority of 
stakeholders. In addition, it can be a very impactful 
tool for triggering the needed energy transition in 
the residential sector. Therefore, the refurbishment 
obligation was included in a scenario with additio-
nal measures in section 4.
IV.  evolution of energy consum-
ption in the residential sector
energy efficiency gains arise from retrofitting of inefficient dwellings and from fuel switches. 
Over the scenario period, the existing building 
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stock shows a progressive disappearance of the 
low-efficiency classes G to D, and a gradual pene-
tration of classes C due to economic incentives 
and learning-by-doing which decreases retrofitting 
costs. Most of the retrofitted stock reaches class C 
in 2050. Nearly no ambitious retrofit to class B or 
A appear, since these retrofitting options remain 
too costly for households given the economic in-
centives and energy prices in the scenario. Even 
the existence of an obligatory renovation fund for 
jointly-owned buildings and the availability of third-
party financing do not decrease the risk aversion of 
the owners of individual houses and jointly-owned 
buildings enough to make such ambitious transi-
tions happen. The pace of the transition is highest 
for social housing, this being consistent with the 
French legislation which requires refurbishment of 
all social housing to reduce the energy consump-
tion of the dwellings exceeding 230 kWh/m2/year 
before 2020 to 150 kWh/m2/year8. Furthermore, 
this share of the residential building park is the 
most structured and does not face the same chal-
lenges as it is the case for jointly-owned buildings 
were complicate decision making procedures delay 
action.
The graphs on page 14 and 15 illustrate the transfor-
mation of the residential building stock according 
to the energy label transitions and the evolution 
of the energy mix for individual houses, social hou-
sing, jointly-owned buildings and new construc-
tions. In all subcategories of existing buildings, 
transitions to upper energy classes appear jointly 
with an important energy substitution from gas 
and fuel towards electricity for heating that cor-
responds in the model to a significant penetration 
of heat pumps (about 7 millions). This substitution 
is driven by the evolution of relative final energy 
consumption prices. 
At the end of the period, final energy consump-
tion per square meter for heating is divided by 
3.2, total final energy for heating by 2.4 and total 
primary energy for heating by 1.8.
Given a behavior function, the model computes9 
the gap between the theoretical energy consump-
tion for heating and real energy consumption 
after a retrofit action or in new energy efficient 
buildings, e.g. the rebound effect. In this scenario, 
given the assumptions of high global prices for 
fossil energy, and additional fiscal measures (pro-
gressive tariffs on electricity and carbon tax on 
fuel and gas), the rebound effect is quite limited. 
It is negative until 2034 and is limited to 4% of 
final energy consumption in 2042.
Concerning energy uses other than primary hea-
ting in residential, the shares of gas and fuel 
(mainly for cooking and for secondary heating 
devices) remain stable. The specific electricity10 
consumption slightly increases until 2050 (+24% 
compared to 2010). This evolution is the combi-
ned effect of improved energy efficiency (auto-
nomous following current trends and induced 
by a 40% increase in electricity prices between 
2010 and 2020) which is more than compensated 
by the development of new electric appliances 
mainly multimedia devices and the population 
increase (+15%). 
Globally, the final energy consumption (heating 
and other uses) per capita is divided by 2 and 
the total final energy consumption decreases by 
37% between 2010 and 2050. The CO2 emissions 
of the residential sector (excluding electricity 
emissions that are included in the power sector) 
decrease by 75% between 2010 and 2050. 
8- These figures corres-
pond to primary energy.
10- Specific electri-
city refers to electric 
consumption in other 
residential uses, mainly 
electric appliances, inclu-
ding lighting, households 
applicances, multimedia 
devices and secondary 
heaters.
9- The model builds on 
a logistic relation that 
links the “service factor” 
(which reflects the gap 
between effective and 
conventional energy 
consumption) to the 
annual heating expen-
diture, as a proxy for 
the price of the heating 
service. It states that the 
higher the efficiency of 
the dwelling, the higher 
the service factor, thus 
inducing sufficiency 
relaxation. Conversely, 
the higher the energy 
price, the lower the ser-
vice factor, thus inducing 
sufficiency strengthe-
ning. Investments that 
move a dwelling from a 
domain of low efficiency 
to a domain of higher 
one (e.g. from class 
F to class C) increase 
the service factor, i.e. 
induce a rebound effect. 
Similarly, switching from 
a given energy carrier to 
one fuelled by a cheaper 
energy (e.g. from fuel to 
wood) within the same 
efficiency domain implies 
a higher service factor.
7 - Final energy consumer prices in the residential sector
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V. Investment and policy costs 
in the residential sector
the governmental subsidies for the transfor-mation process of the residential building park 
decrease over the scenario period. Households 
carry the main share of the charges used for the 
refurbishment of the residential sector and energy 
efficient constructions. 
The households’ expenditures for energy consump-
tion, thermal refurbishment and construction in 
2020 2030 2040 2050
Policy measures costs for the government (Billion €)
tax credit 3.3 2.5 0.8 0.5
eco-loan 3.3 1.9 0.6 0.4
Additional costs for households (Billion €)
construction 9.5 9.4 7.7 6.3
Refurbishment 14.9 10.3 3 1.8
19 - Households budget shares for residential energy services
Residential energy services 
(heating and other uses)
the residential sector decrease over the scenario 
period from 6% in 2010 to 4,5% in 2050 of the 
overall household budget. The energy expenditures 
peak in 2012. Energy efficiency measures reduce 
the energy consumption and thus the allocated 
energy budget of households. 
The expenditures for construction and refurbish-
ment peak later in 2022 which is consistent with the 
transformation process of the residential building 
stock and the investments necessary for the switch 
from class D to C. 
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Transport sector
I. overview 
the transport sector is responsible for nearly 40% of the CO2 emissions in 2010. Its emis-
sions increased by 16% between 1990 and 2010. 
The main source of these emissions is the fuel com-
bustion for road transport. Regarding the modal 
split, both passengers transport and freight trans-
port are highly dominated by road transportation.
The trips for less than 50 km represent 89% of 
the journeys. Trips over 500 km correspond to 
only 1.3% of the journeys but 40% of the traveled 
distances. Irrelevant in terms of km but important 
in number of journeys are our feet: walking repre-
sents 22% of local mobility but only sums up to 
2% of the traveled distances. 
In 1990, the transport sector was responsible for 29% 
of the total French final energy consumption ; in 2010, 
it increased to 32% which represents an increase of 
25% of the amount of energy consumption.
The investment in transport infrastructures in 
the recent decades shows that the road trans-
port mode was clearly favored. The road network 
increased from 5,300 km in 1980 to 11,054 km 
in 2008. Between 1994 and 2008, the highway 
traffic has increased by 55%. The high-speed rail 
network (TGV) has increased from 1,574 km in 1994 
to 1,847 km in 2008 – but the number of passengers 
raised by 146%. 
Freight traffic decreased by 15% during the eco-
nomic crisis in 2009 but since then, it is slowly 
returning to its former level.
climate and energy objectives:
The French legislation includes several objectives 
concerning the transport sector:
* A 20% reduction of the greenhouse gases emis-
sions in 2020 (base year 2005).
* The adoption of an eco-tax on heavy road freight 
transport in 2011 (has been delayed).
* Increasing the traffic share of all transport modes 
except air and road from 14% to 25% in 2022. 
The intermediate objective in 2012 corresponds 
to an increase of 25% compared to 2007 (the 
share has decreased since then therefore the 
objective is not likely to be achieved).
* The construction of 2,000 km of high-speed train 
before 2020.
* 50% reduction of the energy consumption per 
passenger and per km of the air traffic before 
2020.  
II.  Representation of the 
transport sector in Imaclim-R
Imaclim represents two kinds of transport acti-vities, differing in the economic processes they 
rely on: transports are either bought transport 
services that are used by individuals or satisfying 
a sector specific transport demand (air transport11, 
water transport, terrestrial freight transport, ter-
restrial passenger transports – taxis or collective 
transports), or self-produced services (with indivi-
dual cars or non-motorized transports).
For passenger  transports, a “time-budget 
constraint” sets an upper boundary for the time 
20 - Modal split in freight transport - 2010 (% tkm) 21 - Modal split in passenger transport - 2010 (% pkm)
Road
2%
89%
9%
Road
Rail Rail
Waterway Cars and autobusses
Air
11- Imaclim-R France 
only represents 
domestic air traffic.
80%
11%
6%
1% 2%
Soft transport modes
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spent daily in transportation. This methodological 
choice relies on the empirical rule named “Zahavi’s 
law”. It shows that since many decades, each day, 
households on average spend the same amount of 
time on transport. The modal choices depend on 
the relative prices and speed of each mode. Each 
mode is characterized by a speed that decreases 
with a higher utilization rate of a specific transport 
infrastructure. Indeed, the more people use a speci-
fic transport infrastructure (each infrastructure has 
a given capacity limit depending on the dedicated 
investments), the higher the risk of congestion is, 
which reduces its speed. As people are bound to a 
stable time budget, when a specific transport infras-
tructure is close to congestion, other modal choices 
will be preferred. The maximum capacity of each 
modal infrastructure depends on the investment 
allocated to the specific infrastructure.
The evolution of transport infrastructures is repre-
sented according to public and private investment 
decisions. In the reference scenario, the infrastruc-
ture development follows the evolution of the modal 
transport demand, either through governmental 
spending in infrastructures or through private in-
vestment from transport sector investors. Climate 
policies are translated for example in an investment 
transfer from road construction to public transport 
infrastructures. 
The evolution of the motorization rate is linked to 
the evolution of households’ income and to urban 
density but is quite insensitive to fuel price changes. 
In contrast to this trend, climate policies such as 
urban planning may lead to a decrease in the moto-
rization rate in the long term.
The  efficiency of  the fleet of  individual cars 
depends on the households’ consumption choices 
and on technical change. The vehicles fleet is disag-
gregated according to the year of first circulation 
and to the energy label (conventional from G to A, 
hybrids or electric). This representation includes the 
specifications of the vehicle related to costs, energy 
efficiency, fixed and variable maintenance costs.
The evolution of energy prices is integrated in the 
evolution of the transport service price for each 
transport service sector (for example in the train or 
in the bus ticket price) and for individual transport 
through fuel prices at the time of purchase and at 
the time of effective consumption.
energy consumptions for freight transport result 
from the following energy efficiency improvements 
assumptions:
* For air transport, fuel consumption decreases by 
0.7% each year. It reflects technological improve-
ment in plane design to lower kerosene consump-
tion and traffic management measures to increase 
planes occupancy rates.
* For water transport, energy consumption per unit 
of transported good remains unchanged.
* For terrestrial freight transport, the average liquid 
fuel consumption is the result of a fuel price elas-
ticity12 set to -0.4 and to a maximum 25% energy 
efficiency improvement compared to 2010. The 
evolution of energy consumption in this sector 
reflects at once technology changes, modal shifts 
(particularly between rail and road freight trans-
port) and modifications of the structural com-
ponents of this sector resulting from changes 
in relative weights of transported materials of 
sub-sectors that compose it.
In Imaclim-R France, freight transport demand 
stems from  the aggregated demand from goods 
transport demand for each productive sector. The 
freight content of economic growth is directly lin-
ked to the consumption styles and to the structure 
of the economy (more services or more industrial 
production). On the contrary, freight activities 
are only weakly sensitive to energy prices. Modal 
freight choices rely on logistics and on the organi-
zation of the supply chain. Given the uncertainty 
of the reaction of firms to energy price variations 
(concerning organizational and logistical decisions), 
these parameters and their evolution are set exo-
genously as scenario variables.
In the reference scenario, the energy consump-
tion for freight transport is only influenced by the 
energy efficiency improvement of heavy trucks. 
In a mitigation scenario, assumptions related to 
spatial organization may lead to a decoupling of 
economic growth and freight transport and thus to 
a decrease of freight transport demand. Assump-
tions related to a change of consumption styles 
or to the structure of the economy may lead to 
a general dematerialization of economic growth 
that induces a decrease in freight transport needs. 
These orientations of the economy are only inves-
tigated in alternative scenarios in part 4. 
III.  Acceptable policy measures 
in the transport sector
1. urban and local transports
urban planning: Economic incentives and regula-
tions aim at limiting the increase in urban sprawl. 
These measures are considered to have an impact 
only from 2030 because of inertia. The increase 
in urban sprawl slows down gradually until 2030. 
After 2030, the trend is reversed and the urban 
density increases again.
urban transports investment program: Invest-
ments in urban transports (buses and tramways 
networks) are doubled during 15 years from 2012. 
A retrofitting railway program is implemented to 
enhance regional rail traffic and improve inter-
12- This means 
that a 1% price 
increase induces a 
0.4% decrease in 
consumption
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modality. The time inertia in the construction of 
infrastructures is taken into account.
teleworking: the assumption related to telewor-
king is that an average of one day of work out 
of ten is carried out by teleworking, taking into 
account that not all activities can be subject to 
teleworking. 
cars occupation rate: Incentives (promotion by 
firms of employee transport plans as well as car-
pooling) are considered to increase the cars occu-
pation rate for urban transport from 1.25 to 1.5. 
2. long distance travels
Rail investment program:  Investments in road 
infrastructures are limited to covering the main-
tenance of infrastructures only. A shift of invest-
ments from road to rail for 20 years aims at ensu-
ring the retrofit of existing railways infrastructures 
to allow an increase of rail market shares for 
regional transports. The construction of new high-
speed infrastructures favors the competitiveness 
of high-speed trains against airplanes.
Kerosene tax: A tax on kerosene consumption for 
air transport is introduced in 2012. It represents 
400€/toe which is comparable to the consump-
tion tax on petroleum products for cars, that is 
130€/tCO2.
3. Individual cars and technological change
Bonus-malus: The “bonus-malus” measure on the 
emissions reductions of new vehicles is extended 
until 2050. It is calibrated in order to foster the 
penetration of clean vehicles (label A+, A and B) 
and to obtain a positive annual financial balance 
for the government budget or close to 0.
4. Freight transport
Heavy truck environmental tax: an eco-tax on 
the liquid fuel consumption of heavy trucks is 
introduced in 2012. It is calibrated to bring in 1.3 
billion € in 2012.
logistics: Policies aiming at improving supply 
chains for production and distribution reduce 
the transport content of consumption. This is 
represented by an annual decoupling of freight 
transport needs of 1% per year for all sectors.
Infrastructures: A program is implemented to 
develop alternatives to the road for the freight 
transport by improving the supply chain of rail 
freight transport and developing rail freight capa-
city. This is represented in the model by additional 
investments in the freight sector from the govern-
ment. The inertia in this sector is considered to be 
important. This is why the exogenous assumption 
is that the modal share of rail transport in freight 
reaches only 20% in 2030 (compared to 9% in 
2010).
carbon tax: A carbon tax gives a price signal to 
reduce highly carbonized energy consumptions and 
to shift the energy production system to low carbon 
technologies. The carbon tax used in the project 
scenario is equal to 32€/tCO2 in 2012, increasing 
gradually to 56€/tCO2 in 2020, to 100€/tCO2 in 
2030, to 200€/tCO2 in 2040 and to 300€/tCO2 
in 2050. In this scenario, the carbon tax income 
is given back to households through lump-sum 
transfers.
IV.  evolution of energy consump-
tion in the transport sector
In this scenario, three mitigation strategies are implemented for passenger mobility: (i) limiting 
the current increase of individual mobility needs 
through territorial and urban planning; (ii) pro-
moting alternatives to individual motorized trans-
portation; and (iii) foster the decarbonization of 
private vehicles.
1. penetration of decarbonized vehicles
The bonus-malus measure is calibrated from 2010 
to 2050 to result in a positive or neutral financial 
balance for the government. It is assessed every 
five years to favor energy efficient vehicles. The 
most emitting vehicles disappear. Electric vehicles 
occupy only niche markets for urban mobility with a 
penetration limited to 5% of the total vehicles fleet 
in 2050. They refer to car sharing systems in urban 
areas. Hybrid range extender13 vehicles massively 
penetrate after 2030. They are best suited to urban 
use but can also be used for long journeys.
13- Range extender 
hybrid vehicles are 
designed to counter 
the small autonomy of 
electric vehicles and the 
high cost of batteries. 
The motor includes 
both a combustion and 
electric motor. The small 
internal combustion 
engine is used only as 
a generator to power 
the electric motor or to 
recharge its batteries. 
Unlike a conventional 
engine, which operates 
over a wide variety of 
power settings and 
operational conditions, 
the range extender 
can be operated under 
optimum conditions at 
all times. Compared to a 
classical hybrid vehicle, 
range extender hybrid 
vehicles have a bigger 
electric engine that is not 
assisted by the internal 
combustion engine.
22 - composition of the vehicles fleet (%)
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2. Biofuels development
The scenario is based on the biofuels development 
scenario in the “World Energy Outlook 2006”. In 
the policy scenario, in 2030, 147 Mtoe of biofuels 
are produced in the world (7% of the total demand 
for road transport fuels). Biodiesel accounts for 15% 
of the biofuel use. In Europe, the share of biodiesel 
in total biofuel consumption  drops from well over 
50% to under 30% in 2030.
The biofuel consumption in the scenario presented 
in this chapter is equal to 5 Mtoe in 2020 and to 
16 Mtoe in 2050 (respectively 9% and 39% of 
total refined petroleum products). A technology 
switch occurs around 2030 from the first-genera-
tion ethanol production (from agricultural sugars 
and starches) towards second-generation biofuels 
(ligno-cellulosic ethanol) as production costs of 
the latter decrease. The use of second-generation 
biofuels attenuates most of the negative impact 
of the first generation biofuels: competition with 
food production, use of agricultural production and 
additional emissions due to land use change (that 
can even exceed those of classical fossil fuels14).
3. evolution of the individual mobility
On average, the mitigation scenario leads to a slight 
increase of individual mobility on the long term 
(+3% compared to 2010 level). This translates into 
a 19% increase of total passengers’ mobility. Never-
theless, in the middle term (2030), the increase of 
energy prices and the inertia in developing alter-
native collective transports lead to a constrained 
mobility with a 4.5% decrease in individual mobility 
and a 4% increase in total passengers mobility 
compared to 2010 levels.
This mitigation scenario is therefore not a restric-
tion or a rationing scenario but a scenario with 
mobility management that takes into account 
bottlenecks and asymptotes in urban sprawl and 
motorization rates.
4. urban and local mobility
The objective of policies and measures imple-
mented for urban mobility is the limitation of the 
increase of urban sprawl, while favoring more 
collective transport infrastructures. Because of 
the inertia of the existing system, these mea-
sures begin to have a significant impact only after 
2030. The mobility in urban areas mainly refers 
to a constrained mobility (daily commuting). The 
two determinants of the total urban mobility are 
the demographic trends in urban areas and the 
urban sprawl. The urban sprawl has an ambivalent 
impact over time: it keeps increasing, particularly 
in urban areas outside Paris, until 2030, and starts 
decreasing after 2030. Congestion increases for 
all transport modes in urban areas, until more 
collective transports are available. In the short run, 
avoiding the impact of increasing oil prices relies on 
reducing mobility by teleworking and the increase 
of the vehicles occupation rate. These measures 
translate the generalization of employee transport 
plan in firms.
5. long distance mobility
A constant time budget, combined with an in-
creased congestion of urban transports lead to a 
restriction of the time available for long journeys. 
Transport is further constrained by a more expen-
sive air transport (kerosene tax) and inertia in 
the development of road alternatives. This partly 
explains the decrease in total passengers’ mobility 
14- ADEME (2010) 
“Analyses de Cycle 
de Vie appliquées 
aux biocarburants 
de première géné-
ration consommés 
en France”, Rapport 
final.
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in 2030. After 2030, more train transport capa-
city is available and part of the time constraint 
is released.
Passenger transport emissions decrease by 66% 
between 2010 and 2050. This reduction results 
from the combination of (i) an average 70% 
reduction in oil consumption of individual cars 
per pkm, (ii) the penetration of biofuels and (iii) 
a 23% increase in car passengers-km. Emissions 
reductions in air traffic are the results of a slight 
decrease of demand and of a 40% energy effi-
ciency improvement.
6.  Freight transport
The eco-tax for heavy trucks enhances techni-
cal change towards more efficient technologies. 
In 2030, the energy efficiency of heavy trucks is 
25% higher.
Overall, the emissions of the freight terrestrial 
sector decrease by 40% between 2010 and 2050. 
This results from (i) a decoupling of freight de-
mand from production since the 60% production 
increase only induces a 20% increase in freight 
demand, (ii) a 30% energy efficiency improvement 
for road transport per unit of good transported, 
(iii) a modal shift towards rail to a modal share of 
20% and (iv) 12% for biofuels penetration.
In total CO2 emissions in the transport sector 
(passenger and freight) decrease by 60% between 
2010 and 2050, and final energy consumption 
decreases by 41%.
V.  Investment and policy costs 
in the transport sector
the fiscal measures applied to the transport sector positively impact the financial balance of 
the government, except for the domestic consump-
tion tax on petroleum products whose receipts 
decrease significantly over time. Thus, the income 
of this tax decreases by 10% in 2020, by 25% in 
2030 and by 50% in 2050. However, the tax rate 
remains the same. Therefore, the income reduction 
is fully attributable to the decrease in consumption 
of imported petroleum products. This would impact 
negatively the government income.
For the infrastructural investments, all the opera-
tions are done neutrally if compared to the refe-
rence scenario. Indeed, the repartition of invest-
ments between transport modes is modified, but 
not the total amount. Then, until 2030, six  billion 
euros are withdrawn from the road investment 
each year and dedicated half to urban road collec-
tive transports and half to railroads. 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Fiscal measures (billion €)
Heavy trucks eco-tax 0 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2
Kerosene tax 0 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.3
Impact on domestic 
consumption tax on  
petroleum products
23.8 21.4 17.9 13.4 12.9
carbon tax 0 13.7 18.1 23.9 34.8
Investments on infrastructures
urban transports +3 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030
Railways +3 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030
Road transports -6 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030
25 - emissions in passenger transports (Mtco2)
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Industry and services
26 - Final energy mix of the industry sector - 2010 27 - Final energy mix of the tertiary sector - 2010
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I. overview
1. the industry 
The energy mix of the industry sector is domina-
ted by fossil fuels (65%). The share of industry in 
final energy consumption decreased from 27% (38 
Mtoe) in 1990 to 22% (35 Moe) in 2010. 
Several sub-sectors contribute to more than 10% 
to industrial emissions:
* Non-metal minerals and construction materials 
(27%).
* Chemical industry (24.7%).
* Metallurgy and steel (17.1%).
* Food processing industry (12%).
The emissions from industrial processes comprise 
emissions from fossil fuels combustion as well as 
emissions from chemical reactions such as during 
the heating of calcium carbonate for cement pro-
duction. The abatement of these emissions can 
be realized through changing the process itself 
or using carbon capture and storage technologies 
(CCS) if the technology is available.
The current economic crisis impacted the French 
industry production and the induced final energy 
consumption (-13% and even about -27% for the 
steel industry). However, in 2009-2010, the indus-
trial production recovered along with the economy, 
and the energy consumption increased by 21%. The 
CO2 emissions of the industrial sector decreased by 
22% between 1990 and 2010. In 1990, the industry 
emitted 28% (85 MtCO2) of the global CO2 emis-
sions and in 2010 only 23% (67 MtCO2).
One issue for the future in France is the indus-
trial level compatible with a low carbon pathway. 
Indeed, the evolution of the imports of manufactu-
red goods and the relocation of industry in France 
– desirable from an economic point of view – would 
critically affect industrial emissions.
2. the services
The tertiary sector used 11% of the total final en-
ergy consumption in France in 2010 (21.7 Mtoe). 
The energy consumption mix is dominated by 
electricity (47%). In addition to the renewable 
share in the electricity mix, thermal renewable 
sources represent only 4%. The CO2 emissions of 
the tertiary sector increased by 9% between 1990 
and 2010, from 28 MtCO2 to 31 MtCO2.
II.  Representation of the 
productive sectors in 
Imaclim-R France
the industry (apart from transport and energy) aggregates very diverse activities, preventing 
Imaclim-R France from explicitly representing indi-
vidual production units. Nonetheless, the inertia of 
the installed capacities and technologies remains 
explicit through a description in capacity vintages. 
Hence, the various industrial processes are sum-
marized by the average consumption of inputs. 
Therefore, the variations of the average consump-
tions translate not only into the improvement of 
technologies but also into structural changes 
between the various subsectors aggregated (for 
instance reducing the share of energy-intensive 
services and increasing the share of other ser-
22 
28 - Final energy consumption of industry (Mtoe) 29 -  competitiveness index for services 
and industry
vices). three mechanisms account for technical 
change: (i) autonomous technical change over 
time, (ii) a trend in structural decrease of energy 
intensity (iii) the improvement of production tech-
niques through more efficient technologies and 
energy substitutions induced by the evolution of 
energy prices.
In the mitigation scenario, the autonomous technical 
change is exogenously increased by 30%. In addition, 
increasing energy prices trigger some substitution 
relying on price competition (favoring less carbon-in-
tensive energies) and endogenous technical change. 
The same description applies for the tertiary sec-
tor.
III.  evolution of energy 
consumption in the industry 
sector
In Imaclim-R France the industry sector
15 roughly 
represents 26% of final energy consumption in 
2010. After energy efficiency improvement across 
the whole economy, the industry still accounts for 
26% in 2050. Since the industry sector in the mo-
del includes the energy-intensive industries such 
as steel, aluminum and chemistry, the final energy 
demand is structurally very important, even if it 
decreases over time. However, behind a demand for 
energy that appears to remain stable, the energy 
efficiency of the industry sector is greatly impro-
ved. Indeed, the final energy used in the sector 
only decreases by 15%, when the level of activity 
increases by almost 35%, leading to an increase 
in energy efficiency of 37%16.
Furthermore, the energy sources undergo a major 
change. The supply of coal remains roughly the 
same, but most of the oil and half of the gas are 
replaced by electricity because of a very competi-
tive electricity price compared to gas. Most of the 
competition stems from the relative prices of the 
two energies. The prices of electricity and gas are 
very close until 2025. Thereafter a gap appears, 
clearly favoring electricity (the prices for industry 
being 40% lower for electricity than for gas for the 
same amount of energy).
The switch from gas to electricity and the energy 
savings induce a decrease of the industrial CO2 
emissions17 from 53 to 23 MtCO2 in 2050. The use 
of the CCS technology for process emissions could 
further reduce the carbon impact of this sector18.
Graph 29 illustrates the increase in competitiveness 
of France against global supply19. The higher the in-
dex, the more favorable the competition for France 
(without giving a quantitative indicator, this graph 
reveals the trend). The industry index remains close 
to 1 for the whole period, which indicates that indus-
trial goods are neither more nor less competitive 
than at the beginning of the period. However, the 
services competitiveness index steadily increases, 
showing that the French tertiary sector improves 
its price competitiveness.
This is due to the evolution of energy costs in pro-
ductions costs for these sectors. In the tertiary 
sector, energy efficiency improvement reduces 
energy costs. On the contrary, in the energy-inten-
sive industries, energy efficiency improvement is 
structurally bounded. Therefore costs cannot be 
reduced as significantly. 
15- This sector includes 
steel, cement, chemistry, 
non-ferrous metals, 
equipment and paper in 
Imaclim.
16- This energy efficiency 
increase corresponds to a 
37% reduction of energy 
intensity, computed as 
the ratio between final 
energy and added value 
(GDP) for the industry 
sector.
17- The industrial 
emissions correspond 
to direct emissions 
(excluding electricity 
generation).
18- This scenario is based 
on a conservative as-
sumption for CCS: it only 
marginally penetrates the 
power sector and is not 
available for industry.
19- This index is compu-
ted as the ratio between 
the world price index and 
the French price index 
for industry. If there is 
a 80% increase in the 
world price and only 
a 20% increase in the 
French price, the compe-
titiveness index equals  
1.5(=180120 ), which is in favor 
of the French goods. The 
base year for the compu-
ted indices is 2004.
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Electricity sector
30 - energy mix of the electricity sector - 2010
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I. overview
In 1990, electricity represented 36% (83 Mtoe) of the primary energy mix but only 18% (26Mtoe) of 
the final energy due to the high share of nuclear in 
the mix. In 2010, 550TWh were produced. It repre-
sented 43% (115Mtoe) of the primary energy mix 
and 24% of the final energy. 67% of the primary 
electricity is lost in the transformation process.
In 2010, the renewable electricity share was about 
15%, with a high share of hydropower. The elec-
tricity export import balance was positive in 2010 
but the imports achieved a historical maximum of 
19.5 TWh. 50 TWh were exported. 
The CO2 emissions of electricity production de-
creased by 19.7% compared to 1990. In 1990, 39 
MtCO2 (10% of the overall CO2 emissions) were 
emitted by the electricity sector compared to 31 
MtCO2 (9%) in 2010.
68% of the final electricity production is consumed 
by the residential and the tertiary sector, 25% by 
the industry and 3% by the transport sector. In 
comparison with the other European countries, 
electricity costs 25% less, so average per capita 
consumption is 21% higher than the European 
average and even 49% higher considering only 
residential consumption. The French specificity of 
electricity demand is electric heating (Joule effect) 
in one third of the buildings stocks and 90% of 
new buildings. This creates a high climate sensiti-
vity of the power sector particularly during peak 
load hours in winter. Every cold wave enhances 
the blackout risk as each degree less causes an 
additional consumption need of 2.3 GW. Another 
controversial question is the future evolution of 
the demand, for instance what will be the impact 
of new end-uses (electric vehicles, electronics…) 
on the total final energy consumption?
climate and energy objectives:
The objective fixed in the French law20 in 2005 to 
reach 21% of renewable energies in the electri-
city mix in 2010 was not achieved. The objective 
of reducing the energy intensity of 2% per year 
was not achieved either. The target21 for 2020 is 
a 27% share of renewables in the final electricity 
production mix.
II.  Representation of the  
electri city sector in 
Imaclim-R France
the electric module of Imaclim-R France is designed to represent the specificities of the 
French power sector. The model accounts for an 
hourly demand by end-use, with an emphasis on 
electric heating. It calculates the evolution of the 
demand load shape to take into account peak load 
capacity needs, the evolution of the hourly elec-
tricity price and the dynamics of investments in 
new power plants.
the demand side: Final demand from each sector 
in Imaclim-R France is aggregated into a total hour-
ly demand. The specificities of seasonal demand 
for electric heating are integrated by deforming 
the shape of the hourly demand. For each year, 
the hourly demand is rearranged in a load dura-
tion curve22 (LDC) that classifies by decreasing 
order the level of production capacity required. 
The load duration curve allows a classification of 
the demand in three demand types: “base demand” 
corresponding to the level of capacity required 
during more than 5000 hours a year, “semi base 
demand” corresponding to a needed utilization of 
capacities between 500 and 5000 hours and “peak 
demand” utilization of capacities below 500 hours.
the supply side: The investment dynamics in the 
power sector are represented via profit-seeking 
investors who invest on the liberalized market. 
Electricity producing technologies are therefore 
competing on the spot electricity market. Different 
technologies exhibit different total production 
costs (composed by investment, maintenance 
and fuel costs). Some technologies like nuclear or 
hydropower have high investment cost and low fuel 
cost. These technologies are usually more suited to 
satisfy base load demand. Other technologies have 
20- POPE Law 
(2005). - Law for 
Planning or Orien-
tations of Energy 
Policies.
21- As expressed 
in France National 
Renewable Energy 
Action Plan (2010).
22- The Load 
Duration Curve 
represents the 
hourly demand for 
capacities (in GW) 
against the capacity 
utilization (the num-
ber of hours that 
the capacities are 
called in a year). It 
is formed by taking 
the hourly demand 
for capacities 
(GW) and sorting 
this demand by 
decreasing order. 
The resulting curve 
shows synthetically 
the peak load, the 
base load and the 
possible discrepan-
cies between the 
amount of peaking 
plants needed and 
the number of hours 
those are used.
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low investment costs but high fuel costs (oil power 
plants). These technologies having a high variable 
cost23 are used less than the base load production 
technologies and respond to peak load demand.
Balancing supply and demand: To satisfy a given 
demand, the least expensive capacities (in terms of 
variable costs) run first, more and more expensive 
technologies are added with increasing demand. 
The spot price is equal to the variable cost of the 
marginal plant, which is the last capacity to be 
put in service.
The profitability for each technology is determined 
by the difference between the income from elec-
tricity sales on the spot market and investment 
and operating costs. The (inframarginal) rent for 
a technology on the spot market is determined 
by the difference between the spot price and the 
variable production costs.
Investment dynamics: In this scenario, only pro-
jects with an expected return rate on investment 
superior to 8% are implemented, with preference 
to short return periods in case of multiple profitable 
investments possible. Technologies that are com-
peting on the spot market are coal and gas with 
or without CCS, oil and nuclear (EPR technology).
Renewable energy technologies (hydropower, 
wind on-shore, wind off-shore, decentralized photo-
voltaic, solar plants, geothermal) do not compete in 
the merit order of the electricity spot market (since 
their production is non-dispatchable, which means 
“unavoidable”). In the scenario, most renewable 
electricity is absorbed and used ; very little cur-
tailment happens. The construction of renewable 
energy capacities is induced by feed-in tariffs high 
enough to ensure the profitability of the techno-
logy. The level of the feed-in tariffs decreases over 
time until these technologies become competitive. 
Feed-in tariffs are paid by all consumers through 
a contribution integrated in the electricity price 
(named Contribution to the Electricity Public 
Service - CSPE in France). The construction of 
renewables with variable production24 triggers 
additional grid investments, thus increasing the 
electricity price for 1€/MWh in reference and 3€/
MWh in the mitigation scenario25 for investing in 
the transport network. These figures do not include 
the additional cost for the distribution network, for 
which a similar amount should be spent to sustain 
the increased renewable supply.
demand side management measures lead to a 
decrease in aggregated power demand but may 
also lead to a smoothing of the shape of the LDC. 
This also contributes to a lower marginal electricity 
spot price. 
III. Acceptable policy measures 
in the electricity sector
progressive tariff: This measure aims at reducing 
electricity consumption by increasing the prices 
above a fixed base consumption. In the scenario 
the progressive tariff is applied on all household 
electricity consumption. For all households, any 
consumption above 60 kWh/m2 is paid at an aug-
mented tariff. The price per additional kWh increase 
by 5% after 2014 in case the consumption exceeds 
this limit and by 10% after 2030.
Feed-in tariffs: Feed-in tariffs for renewable ener-
gies are economic incentives to facilitate the mar-
ket penetration of these technologies to accelerate 
the learning effect. Feed-in tariffs are normally 
decreasing over time and end when the techno-
logies achieve price competitiveness with other 
technologies.
contribution to the electricity public service26: 
This tax is calibrated at base year. The increase 
in the value corresponds to the increase of the 
payment of feed-in tariff to renewable producers.
carbon tax: A carbon tax gives a price signal to 
reduce highly carbonized energy consumptions and 
to shift the energy production system to low carbon 
technologies. The carbon tax used in the project 
scenario is equal to 32€/tCO2 in 2012, increasing 
gradually to 56€/tCO2 in 2020, to 100€/tCO2 in 
2030, to 200€/tCO2 in 2040 and to 300€/tCO2 
in 2050. In this scenario, the carbon tax income 
is given back to households through lump-sum 
transfers.
demand side management: Peak demand can be 
managed either with peak capacities (including oil-
fuelled turbines, peak hydropower or pumped-sto-
rage plants) or with interruptible contracts remai-
ning at the same level as today. In addition, when 
the electric consumption due to electric heating 
decreases, peak demand decreases and conversely.
Interdiction of electric heating (Joule effect): 
Electric heating is not banned. However, the imple-
mentation of the thermal regulation up from 2012 is 
supposed to exclude de facto electric heating (excep-
tion heat pumps) from the technology choices. As 
the maximum energy consumption is defined in 
primary energy per m2 per year and the conversion 
factor is about 2.58 (between primary and final 
electricity), electricity exceeds the limit. 
23- The variable cost 
is the part of the 
power generation 
costs that is proportio-
nal to the production: 
mainly fuel costs, 
carbon taxes and any 
operation and mainte-
nance costs that are 
proportional to the 
production.
24- Also known 
as « intermittent » 
renewables.
25- Cf. the following 
publications for costs 
evaluation: 
- Deutsche Energie 
Agentur (2005): Inte-
gration into the natio-
nal grid of onshore and 
offshore wind energy 
generated in Germany 
by the year 2020. 
- Richard Green 
(2009): Climate-
Change Mitigation 
from Renewable 
Energy: Its Contribu-
tion and Cost. 
- House of Lords Select 
Committee on the 
European Commu-
nities, 12th Report, 
Session 1998-99. 
- House of Lords, 
Economic Affairs Com-
mittee, 2008“The Eco-
nomics of Renewable 
Energy”, Session 
2007-08, Economic 
Affairs Committee 
Publications.
26- This tax supports 
feed-in tariffs, electri-
city supply in isolated 
territories and social 
tariffs.
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lifetime extension of nuclear plants: The oldest 
existing nuclear plants (23GW) are decommissioned 
when their lifetime reaches 40 years. This decom-
missioning is smoothed in time in order to spread 
the construction of new capacity that is needed for 
the replacement over a wider time period. Lifetime 
of the remaining 40 GW of existing nuclear plants is 
extended to 60 years for an additional investment 
cost of 0.7bn€/GW. In 2050, still 10GW of the today 
existing plants are operating
technologies acceptability: All technologies for 
electricity production are considered as acceptable, 
except shale gas.
IV.  evolution of energy  
consum ption in the 
electricity sector
the total electricity production increases over the scenario period from 50 Mtoe to 60 Mtoe in 
2050. This 20% increase is relatively low compared 
to the threefold increase in the same amount of 
time between 1973 and 2010. The main sectors 
responsible for the increase are the industrial and 
tertiary consumption mainly because gas is subs-
tituted by electricity. 
The stakeholders disapproved of the construction 
of new power plants for exports so the electricity 
exports in this scenario rapidly decline. France is 
no longer a net exporter of electricity after 2020 ; 
some imports (for less than 1 Mtoe or 12 TWh) re-
main throughout the period. The electricity imports 
(the part of the graph under zero) are used to 
satisfy the peaking heating demands in winter. The 
retrofitting of the residential sector that increases 
energy efficiency for heating and the switch from 
electric heaters to heat pumps reduces the electri-
city peak in winter. But approaching 2050 the peak 
increases due to a replacement from gas heating 
by heat pumps reaching a maximum of 103 GW.
The partial fuel switch from gas to electricity in the 
industry sector takes place before 2020. On the 
contrary, the consumption of the services steadily 
increases at a rate exceeding 2% before 2025 and 
around 1% afterwards. The electricity consumption 
of energy producing industries (for example oil 
refineries) decreases slowly. Electricity transport 
losses follow proportionally the increasing electri-
city consumption. 
In the residential sector, the electricity use for 
heating slightly increases as gas for heating is re-
placed by heat pumps. Residential uses other than 
primary heating decrease before 2020 (from 9 to 
8 Mtoe) and increase until 10 Mtoe after 2020. Due 
to more and more new electricity devices (espe-
cially multi-media), the consumption especially for 
these energy services increases over the scenario 
period. Traditional domestic electricity services 
31 - electricity demand disagreggation (Mtoe) 
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like lighting, washing, cooking etc. decrease with 
increasing energy efficiency.
Before 2030, the consumption of electric vehicles 
does not appear on the graph since 0.4 Mtoe does 
not represent an important share of the overall 
consumption. It increases until 2040 and stabi-
lizes at 0.6 Mtoe. In this scenario, the charging 
occurs evenly during 24 hours a day since the 
electric vehicles fleet corresponds to car sharing 
systems. Thus, the supplementary demand due to 
charging adds to base load, and does not worsen 
peak imbalances thanks to the diversity and the 
dispersal of the demand.
prices
The electricity prices for households show a sharp 
increase between 2010 and 2020, climaxing at 41% 
in 2020 compared to 2010. The price stabilizes 
thereafter around 160€/MWh (16c€/kWh). It repre-
sents an increase of 34% compared to the price in 
2011. The peak in prices around 2020 is due to the 
combination of (i) the penetration of gas combined 
cycle replacing some of the nuclear capacities (ii) 
the acceleration in the installation of renewable 
capacities and (iii) the oil-fuelled turbine to face 
the variability of renewables. The stable long-term 
increase is due to renewables being more expensive 
than the old nuclear thermal power generation 
units and the need for new capacity building during 
the period.
V.  Investment and policy costs 
in the electricity sector
Investments
The investments in generation capacities throu-
ghout the period are mostly directed at building 
renewable capacities. The share of renewables 
in the electricity mix is 20% in 2020 and 50% 
in 2050. In addition, 43 GW of nuclear plants are 
extended during 20 years for 700 million euros 
per GW. Renewables and nuclear plants extension 
constitutes the bulk of the investment until 2050. 
In addition, 9 nuclear plants (European Pressu-
rized Reactor) are built to compensate part of the 
decommissioning occurring between 2020 and 
2030 for 2,9 bn €/GW, each of them with a capa-
city of 1630 MW. The investment amount steadily 
rises from 8 billion € in 2010 to almost 17 billion € in 
2026 to finance the transition. After that, it steadily 
decreases to 6 billion a in 2050.
Average annual expenditures for electricity generation (Billion €)
period 2011-2020 2021-2030 2031-2040 2041-2050
Investment 12 15 9 6
Fuel costs 1 1.4 0.1 0.6
carbon costs 8.7 10.9 2.8 3.5
32 - consumer electricity price (€/Mwh)  33 - electricity production mix (tWh)
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The period between 2010 and 2025 is the most 
critical one. Indeed, the beginning of nuclear plants’ 
decommissioning, in addition to the growing share 
of variable renewables and the uncertainties sur-
rounding the electricity supply market induce the 
construction of power plants fuelled by fossil ener-
gies. Between 2010 and 2020 more than 10 GW of 
oil-powered gas turbines and gas-fuelled combined 
cycles plants are built, which explains the emissions 
peak with an increase of 49% in the electricity sec-
tor. This reinforces the emergency in implementing 
energy efficiency and demand-side management to 
avoid building these carbon-intensive power plants. 
However, this transition from a nuclear-dominated 
mix to a mix relying also on renewables is short-
lived, with emissions receding after 203027. After 
2040 the second phase of decommissioning of the 
extended nuclear plants creates some tensions in 
the electricity supply, leading to a return of some 
emissions in the electric sector, because of gas 
(mainly gas with CCS).
policy costs
In the model, fiscal policies for the electric sector 
are reduced to the contribution towards financing 
feed-in tariffs and the carbon tax. The feed-in tariffs 
are neutral in the balance of the government since 
they are fully paid by the final consumers. Most 
demand-side management measures are paid for 
either by consumers or the electricity supplier. 
Fiscal measures (Billion €)
Feed-in tariffs 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Additionnal 
CSPE Income 
=  
feed-in tariffs 
expense
2.9 1.9 7.2 17.8 12.7
Carbon Tax 0 13.7 18.1 23.9 34.8
35 - Available capacities (MW)
34 - Investment in new capacities (GW)
27- Nuclear energy 
and renewable ener-
gies have no emis-
sions in the scenario 
because their 
up- and downstream 
emissions are 
allocated in other 
sectors. For example 
the construction of 
the building for a 
nuclear power plant 
is captured by the 
building sector. Only 
the combustion 
emissions of the 
electricity sector 
are shown in the 
graph 47 that 
means only the 
emissions of fossil 
fuel based electri-
city production.
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Macroeconomic 
impacts & scenario 
results
I. Global context and world 
visions
the scenario‘s global context sets up the framework for the study. This global vision 
answers the following questions. What outcome for 
international climate negotiations? How abruptly 
will the Peak-Oil shock western economies? What 
orientation for technical change? What consump-
tion styles will prevail? For developed economies? 
For emerging economies?
The assumptions we made are the following. 
Consumption styles in Europe and in France are 
considered to remain material-intensive. We have 
not considered in this scenario any change in 
consumption styles or consumers’ preferences. 
A decoupling of growth and resources use will be 
further investigated in section 4. In the scenario 
presented here, no global climate agreement is 
reached ; climate policies coordination only exists 
at the EU level. This situation leads to a world with 
a high energy demand, and to high fossil energy 
prices. Energy prices double at the end of the pe-
riod, following the “World energy outlook” 2011, as 
requested by the stakeholders (graph 36). Crude oil 
prices reach 160 €/barrel in 2050. Because of this 
high fossil energy prices, technological innovation 
focuses on renewable and energy efficiency, as well 
as on carbon capture and sequestration.
II.   Macroeconomic dynamics of 
the mitigation scenario
1. economic growth rate
The growth engine in Imaclim-R conventionally 
consists of exogenous demographic trends and la-
bor productivity changes, and is fuelled by regional 
investment rates and investments allocation among 
sectors. Endogenous disequilibria are possible so as 
to capture transition costs after a policy decision 
or an exogenous shock. Investment decisions are 
driven by profit maximization under imperfect 
expectations in non-fully competitive markets.
The population follows the 2010 INSEE central 
demographic scenario and equals 72.3 million in 
2050, i.e. a 15% increase compared to 2010. In 
the reference scenario (also called Business As 
Usual scenario, i.e. without climate policies), the 
average annual economic growth rate is about 
1.24% between 2010 and 2050. The overall eco-
nomic impact of the mitigation measures is posi-
tive, except in the short-term, with a negative 
impact until 2017 due to the introduction of the 
carbon tax in 2012. Thereafter, GDP is higher and 
unemployment is lower than in the reference 
scenario. 
36 - World fossil energy prices scenario (a/toe)
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37 - Macreconomic trends in Mitigation scenario / Reference (base 1 in 2010)
38 - consumer energy prices a/toe
39 - Household expenditures
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2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2050 2010-2050
Reference 1.19 1.29 1.2 1.22
Mitigation 1.24 1.47 1.11 1.24
The impact is particularly positive from 2025 
to 2035. At this date, the electricity price in 
the mitigation scenario is around 25% lower 
than in the reference scenario. Moreover, fossil 
energy prices get much more expensive than in 
the reference scenario because of the carbon 
tax. The combination of both factors induces a 
substantial energy switch towards electricity for 
productive sector and households. In addition, 
energy efficiency measures induce a decrease 
of the energy expenditures:
* In household budgets’ (which is not compensated 
by the increase in construction and additional 
renovation costs).
* For service industries that are not energy-inten-
sive, which furthermore reinforces the interna-
tional competition of French goods.
2. energy efficiency, dependency to imports 
and energy bill
The development of non-fossil energies in 
conjunction with energy efficiency measures 
constitutes a protection against the negative 
impacts of the increase in energy prices and of 
the French import dependency. In the reference 
scenario, the energy import values represent 
more than 5% of GDP between 2019 and 2035. 
In the mitigation scenario, the energy import 
intensity of the GDP peaks in 2020 at 4.7% and 
gradually declines to a stable level 1.7% after 
2040.
An often-overlooked fact is the dependency to 
uranium imports for the French energy mix. Even 
if the impact on the energy bill is negligible, the 
uranium consumption for nuclear power plants 
creates a dependency and increase energy vulne-
rability for France.
40 - evolution of the energy bill
41 - evolution of the value of energy net imports 
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42 - Annual co2 emission reductions induced by the carbon tax
43 - Gdp according to carbon tax recycling options 44 -  unemployment rate according to carbon tax 
recycling options 
46 -  consumer electricity price according to carbon tax 
recycling options
45 -  emissions according to carbon tax recycling options
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III.  carbon tax: a necessary 
measure?
1.  the marginal impact on emissions  
reductions
One of the most emblematic measures of the sce-
nario is the carbon tax. In order to disentangle 
its leverage power on emissions reductions, the 
marginal impact of the carbon tax on sectoral 
emissions reduction has been calculated. Thus, 
graph 42 illustrates the emissions reduction when 
the tax is implemented. As such, these emissions 
reductions are conditional to other policy measures 
implemented in the acceptable mitigation scenario. 
The emissions reductions would be much higher if 
the only implemented policy measure were the tax.
The carbon tax is very efficient in decarbonizing 
the power sector particularly during the transi-
tion phase between 2020 and 2030 and at the 
end of the period when a large amount of nuclear 
plants are decommissioned. The carbon tax is also 
decisive in the renovation decisions in the residen-
tial sector during the whole period. Finally, the 
industrial emissions are much higher in the short 
term without a carbon tax serving as a signal for 
investments.
2. carbon tax recycling options
The carbon tax is exogenously set in the scenario 
and follows the recommendations of the ”Quinet” 
governmental report28 until 2030 (32€/tCO2 in 
2012, 56€/tCO2 in 2020, 100€/tCO2 in 2030) and 
then extrapolated until 2050 (200€/tCO2 in 2040 
and 300€/tCO2 in 2050). The carbon tax pathway 
is anticipated in the power sector but other sectors 
and households form myopic expectations, based 
on the yearly tax. 
The recycling of the tax is a lump sum transfer to 
households by default in the description of the 
mitigation scenario in the previous section. Two 
other options are investigated to take into consi-
deration stakeholder contributions: i) recycling 
towards subsidies for renewable energy develop-
ment and energy efficiency improvements, and ii) 
a recycling towards lowering payroll taxes.
The economic impacts of the three variants are 
given in graphs 43 to 46. In the long term, the 
recycling towards subsidies for renewable develop-
ment and energy efficiency improvements have the 
most positive impact on the GDP development. In 
addition, these variant leads to the most ambitious 
emissions reduction. On the other hand, the variant 
with a recycling towards lower payroll taxes has 
the most positive influence on the employment 
situation. The consumer electricity price varies 
widely depending on the chosen recycling option 
after 2035: the lowest price appears in the variant 
with a recycling towards subsidies for renewable 
development and energy efficiency and leads to 
an improved economic growth compared to other 
options.
IV.  co2 emissions reductions 
of the mitigation scenario
At the end of the period, the integration of all mea-sures considered acceptable by stakeholders 
leads to CO2-related energy emissions equal to 126 
Mt CO2. The following graph describes the sectoral 
contributions leading to this 60% decrease in emis-
sions compared to 2010 and -68% compared to 1990.
The decarbonization of the electricity sector is 
difficult between 2015 and 2025 with the first 
wave of nuclear plants decommissioning. During 
this transition period, gas plants are built which 
28- Alain Quinet 
(2009) : “La valeur 
tutélaire du car-
bone”, Centre d’ana-
lyse stratégique.
47 - sectoral co2 emissions
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V. drivers of co2 emissions 
reductions
the “Kaya identity” breaks down the emissions evolution into several drivers as follows:
POP GDP PEFE
GDP      FE      PE     CO2CO2 =  POP  
inhab D Mtoe
 D        Mtoe    Mtoe    tCO2tCO2 = inhab 
It states that total emissions levels can be expressed 
as the product of five inputs: population (POP), per 
capita income ( 
POP
GDP
 ), final energy intensity of GDP 
( GDP
FE  ), efficiency of the transformation of primary 
energy into final energy ( FE
PE  ) which refers to the 
efficiency of the French energy system, carbon 
content of primary energy ( PE
CO2 ).
In the graph, the evolution of each of these drivers 
is given between 2010 and 2050. It shows that 
during the period:
* population increases by 15%, 
* the per capita income increases by 41%, 
* the final energy intensity of the GDP decreases 
by 51%, 
* the primary energy needed per unit of final en-
ergy consumption reduces by 18%
* the CO2 content of the primary energy reduces 
by 38%.
Globally, energy efficiency and structural changes 
represent two thirds of the emissions reductions and 
the penetration of decarbonized energy represents 
one third of the emissions reductions. Following 
historic trends, population keeps increasing, albeit 
with a decreasing growth rate (from more than 
1.5% per year in the 1960 until a predicted 0.2% 
in 2050). The GDP per capita growth was at a very 
high level (more than 4%) until the end of the 1970s, 
remained just below 2% until the 2000 and remains 
on average just below 1% over the simulated period. 
Final energy intensity of the GDP decreases, with 
a steadily growing speed (from -0.3% a year in the 
1990s until -3% a year at the end of the 2020s), 
continuing the historic trend. After 2035, a shift in 
the simulated trend can be observed, no further 
reduction occurs. The same analysis can be applied 
to the energy efficiency of the French energy trans-
formation system. The carbon intensity of primary 
energy sharply decreases, continuing the trend set 
after the construction of nuclear power generation 
capacities in the 1990s. After 2040, the carbon in-
tensity remains stable, thus preventing the scenario 
from reaching a Factor Four. The end of the period is 
the second wave of nuclear plants decommissioning. 
In the scenario, new gas plants are introduced at this 
time to bridge the gap between EPR and renewable 
production on the one hand and electricity demand 
on the other hand.
49 - evolution of the co2 emissions drivers (base 1 in 2010)
48 -  comparison of the mitigation scenario emission 
trajectory to Factor Four trajectories
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induces new emissions for the electricity sector. 
To limit these “transition emissions”, priority has 
to be given to very ambitious energy efficiency 
measures to decrease electricity demand during 
this transition period and to the development of 
renewable energies on the short term. The main 
difficulty for decarbonization is the transport sec-
tor, where emissions still represent 60 MtCO2, i.e. 
half of 2050 total CO2 emissions. 
The CO2 emissions gap in 2050 between reaching a 
Factor Four and this mitigation scenario represents 
28 MtCO2. This still represents 25% of remaining 
emissions in the mitigation scenario at the end of 
the period. Until 2042, the CO2 emissions trajec-
tory of the mitigation scenario is consistent with a 
Factor Four trajectory. The trajectory even achieves 
a 31% CO2 reduction in 2020 (compared to 1990). 
However, emissions reductions decelerate at the 
end of the period and the emissions level plateaus 
at 126 MtCO2. 
Mtoe
[equation]
[units]
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Emissions reductions 
and emissions scope
An important share of greenhouse gases emis-sions is not considered in the project scope. 
The scenario only focuses on energy-related 
domestic CO2 emissions. Agricultural emissions, 
except energy-related CO2 emissions, were not 
taken into account, thus overlooking the issue 
of land-use change. Upstream and downstream 
emissions outside the domestic perimeter were 
not covered by the present study either. This last 
point refers to the difference between accounting 
emissions in terms of production on a territory or 
in terms of consumption (which means accounting 
for imports and excluding exports). Finally, inter-
national transport was not listed in the French 
emissions. Besides, other greenhouse gases are 
outside the scope of this study.
This scenario therefore focuses on only 69%29 
of the overall French domestic emissions (share 
of CO2 within the total French production related 
emissions). If consumption-related emissions from 
production outside the French borders are added, 
the scenario presented here only accounts for 44% 
of the French emissions. 
A 68% emissions reduction in 2050 represents a 
46% reduction of the total French GHG emissions 
and only a 29% reduction of the total consumption-
related French GHG emissions30. In conjunction 
with the uncertainties surrounding the energy 
transition, this prospect emphasizes the impor-
tance of at least insuring a Factor Four in France 
to fight climate change.
As a result, the following section first delves into 
uncertainties. Then, it presents additional mea-
sures and their impact on the energy consumption, 
emissions reduction, investment and price deve-
lopment. These measures were not considered to 
be acceptable by at least half of the stakeholders. 
Finally, a combination of measures reaching the 
Factor Four is explored.
29- CITEPA (2011) 
“Inventaire des 
émissions en 
France”.
30- Edgar G. 
Hertwich / Glen 
P. Peters (2009) 
“Carbon Footprint 
of Nations: A Global, 
Trade-Linked Analy-
sis”, Environmental 
science & techno-
logy, 43 (16).
emissions reduction scope (compared to 1990)
French consumption-related greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions 
French domestic GHG emissions 
French domestic CO2 emissions
-68% -46% -29% Emissions 
reductions  
of the scenario 
depending on 
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50 - Gdp Mitigation/Reference according to fossil energy prices
Reconciling stakeholders’ 
acceptance and ambitious climate objectives4
I. the role of fossil energy prices
In the previous section, the mitigation scenario was based on fossil energy prices from the World 
Energy Outlook (IEA, 2011). To show the impact of 
energy prices assumptions on mitigation scenarios, 
we investigate two other scenarios: one with fossil 
energy prices 30% lower, and one with fossil energy 
prices 30% higher.
Unsurprisingly, higher (respectively lower) energy 
prices lead to higher (respectively lower) emission 
reductions. Nevertheless, emission reductions in 
2020, compared to 1990 are always higher than 
25%. In the long term, only high energy prices 
are consistent with a Factor Four. In the low prices 
scenario, emissions increase in the short term, 
because relative energy prices between 2010 and 
2020 favor a substitution from oil, coal and elec-
tricity towards gas. In the long term, total CO2 
emissions only decrease by 57% compared to 2010. 
The main sectoral impact compared to the central 
energy prices scenario is on the renovation of the 
existing buildings stock. With low energy prices, 
economic incentives for refurbishment are not 
high enough to induce a significant transition to 
lower energy classes.
In the scenario with lower fossil fuel prices, the 
decarbonization of the power sector is complete 
because electricity prices remain higher than gas 
prices during the whole period, therefore electricity 
demand is reduced compared to other scenarios. 
With a lower demand it is less challenging to decar-
bonize the power production. 
The scenario with higher energy prices has a higher 
decarbonization rate on the long term but for other 
reasons: as the overall costs are higher, the CCS 
technology becomes competitive and reduces the 
emissions of the fossil power production. 
Whatever the assumptions regarding fossil energy 
prices, GDP growth in mitigation scenarios is always 
higher than in the corresponding reference sce-
nario (i.e. with the same energy prices assump-
tions). This result underlines the importance of the 
implementation of mitigation policies to reduce 
the vulnerability regarding the evolution of fossil 
energy prices.
After studying the acceptability of policy measures in the previous section, we now focus on other types of determinants which could significantly 
impact the CO2 emissions trajectory, namely the uncertainties around fossil 
energy prices, a border tax adjustment and a change of the development 
styles. The uncertainty surrounding these scenario variants is of a comple-
tely different nature compared to the issue of stakeholders’ acceptability. In 
addition, we explore other measures which were not deemed “acceptable” but 
can lead to the Factor Four.
total and sectoral emissions reduction compared to 2010 according to the fossil energy prices
2020 2030 2040 2050
Low Central High Low Central High Low Central High Low Central High
Industry31 -33% -33% -33% -38% -37% -53% -48% -59% -67% -57% -57% -77%
tertiary32 -34% -36% -38% -40% -39% -59% -44% -49% -64% -47% -49% -67%
Agriculture -19% -24% -20% -26% -30% -48% -30% -42% -58% -33% -40% -61%
transport -8% -19% -19% -22% -35% -37% -38% -55% -57% -54% -60% -65%
Residential -28% -44% -37% -43% -62% -61% -54% -72% -74% -65% -75% -79%
electricity -61% 49% -53% -34% -68% -43% -99% -100% -100% -100% -86% -99%
total -18% -15% -24% -26% -39% -43% -45% -59% -64% -57% -60% -71%
total /1990 -25% -31% -31% -33% -50% -48% -50% -67% -67% -60% -68% -74%
31- The “industry” 
denomination refers 
to energy-intensive 
industry.
32- The “tertiary” 
aggregates services 
and the manufac-
ture that is not 
intensive in energy.
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33- The ability of an 
economy to grow wit-
hout corresponding 
increases in envi-
ronmental pressure, 
particularly in terms 
of the use of natural 
resources, is referred 
to as decoupling 
or eco-economic 
decoupling.
34- Reshoring is 
defined as the reloca-
tion of activities from 
foreign countries 
back to France, as op-
posed to offshoring. 
For instance, relo-
cation of activities 
from France to China 
is called offshoring 
whereas bringing 
back the activities 
in France is called 
reshoring.
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II. the impact of the development 
style
two variants refer to the evolution of values and standards:
* The decoupling33 of consumption styles: French 
households are considered to change their 
consumption patterns and to consume less mate-
rial goods and more services. 
* The reshoring34 of production capacities back to 
France: French consumers and producers prefer 
to consume French products instead of importing.
In the reshoring scenario, households agree to pay 
higher prices for goods if these goods are produced 
in France. Logically, this raises consumption prices 
(+3% in 2050). The combined effect of higher 
prices and reshoring on final consumption levels is 
almost neutral. On the one hand, industrial produc-
tion decreases, and the other hand, services and 
manufacture production increases. GDP is 0.6% 
higher in 2050, and CO2 emissions are between 
1 and 3% higher compared to the acceptable sce-
nario in 2050. Overall competitiveness decreases, 
but more of the French consumption is produced 
in France.
In the decoupling scenario, policies and measures 
are implemented in a French economic context 
with a 30% decrease of the industrial and material 
content of consumption in 2050. The decrease 
* presented in chapter 3.
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of the material consumption is partly compen-
sated by more consumption of services. Overall 
final consumption is 2.5% higher in 2050. The 
consequence on the economy is a 2% GDP in-
crease compared to the acceptable scenario in 
2050, and a nearly 2% decrease in CO2 emissions. 
The consumption price index slightly decreases 
because of the diminution of the weight of energy 
expenditures on the economy. For the same reason, 
the price competitiveness index mildly increases.
If both these variant exhibit an increased GDP, the 
results in terms of emissions and economic activity 
are different. Relocation increases CO2 emissions 
as well as the consumer price index. However, the 
economic decoupling allows a higher level of acti-
vity without a raise in CO2 emissions.
III.  do we need a border tax 
adjustment?
A number of policies have been suggested to address concerns over competitiveness losses 
due to one country introducing a carbon tax while 
another country does not. In this variant, the im-
pact of the implementation of a border tax adjust-
ment (BTA) at the EU27 level is analyzed. The role 
of a BTA is to address the competitiveness losses 
which stems from the price distortion induced by 
the carbon taxation. This BTA taxes imported goods 
in the manufacturing sector. Highly energy-inten-
sive industrial goods are not subject to the BTA, as 
we consider that European imports mainly consist 
of manufactured goods. The level of taxation is 
subject to the additional carbon content compa-
red to EU average carbon content. This additional 
measure is computed alone in a first scenario, and 
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57 -  co2 emissions (compared  
to the mitigation scenario*)
59 -  consumption price index (compared  
to the mitigation scenario*)
61 -  competitiveness index (compared  
to the mitigation scenario*)
58 -  Gdp (compared to the mitigation 
scenario*)
60 -  Final consumption (compared  
to the mitigation scenario*)
62 -  production index (compared  
to the mitigation scenario*)
BTA
BTA
BTA Industry
BTA + Reshoring  
+ Decoupling  
Manufacture and 
services
BTA + Reshoring  
+ Decoupling
BTA + Reshoring 
+ Decoupling
BTA + Reshoring  
+ Decoupling  
Industry
BTA Manu-
facture and 
services
* presented in chapter 3.
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63 -  comparison of the Additional Measures scenario emission 
trajectory to Factor 4 trajectories
64 - sectoral co2 emissions in the Additional Measure scenario
M
tC
O
2
M
tC
O
2
300
300
350
350
400
400
250
250
200
200
50
50
0
0
150
150
100
100
2010
2010
2030
2030
2020
2020
2040
2040
2015
2015
2035
2035
2025
2025
2045
2045
2050
Factor Four-20% in 2020-30% in 2020
2050
Industry Manufacture and services Agriculture
Transport Residential Electricity
a second scenario gathers the BTA and previous 
assumptions related to decoupling and reshoring.
Logically, the direct impacts of the BTA are a rein-
forced international competitiveness, but also an 
increase of consumer prices. As the BTA is ap-
plied only for the manufactured goods (and not 
on industry), manufacturing increases, but the 
energy-intensive industry production decreases. 
Due to the relative weights of these sectors in the 
French economy, the global outcome on the longer 
term is a slightly increased economic growth, with 
a more significant emissions decrease. 
If assumptions related to reshoring and decoupling 
are added, economic and environmental outcomes 
of the implementation of the BTA are significantly 
improved. In this variant, CO2 emissions drop by 
an additional 5% in 2050, GDP and final consump-
tion levels increase by 2%, while competitiveness 
increases. The only drawback would be the 5% 
increase of the consumer price index.
IV. How to reach the Factor Four?
Additional measures that were considered as acceptable by about 50% of stakeholders are 
implemented to further CO2 emissions reductions:
A carbon-energy tax (cet): the carbon tax is 
replaced by a carbon-energy tax to give a fur-
ther incentive to reduce energy consumption. It 
taxes the energy content and the carbon content 
of the energy and is applied to all the forms of 
energy (coal, gas, oil, nuclear) except renewable 
energies. So electricity is also taxed. The tax rate 
corresponding to the carbon content is still the 
same as in section 3. The tax rate concerning the 
energy content is calibrated in 2012 so that the total 
income from the energy part of the CET equals the 
total income from the carbon content.
This CET is calibrated in order to align the energy 
part of the tax with the amount of the carbon 
part of the tax on average. The CET induces a tax 
level corresponding to a doubling on average of 
the previous carbon tax for fossil fuels. For car-
bon-free energy, the CET adds a tax valued as the 
energy part of the CET on fossil fuels. The CET 
aims at introducing more sufficiency in households’ 
behaviors, particularly concerning specific electri-
city consumption, and more energy efficiency in 
industry and in the tertiary sector.
A refurbishment obligation is applied to the 
building stock. The planning of the obligation is 
organized following the type of building (individual 
houses, collective dwellings and social houses) and 
the energy label of the building, beginning with the 
less energy-efficient classes. The refurbishment 
aims at reaching label B (80 kWh/m2/year). The 
obligation is first applied to social houses because 
this type of housing is best suited to implement 
such a measure and because of fuel poverty consi-
derations, due to its existing centralized ownership 
structure. Implementation dates are given in the 
following table. Refurbishments are calibrated in 
sectoral emissions reductions / 2010 in the additional measures scenario
2020 2030 2040 2050
Industry -41% -43% -57% -63%
Manufacture and services -51% -55% -70% -75%
Agriculture -32% -37% -52% -58%
Transport -23% -40% -57% -63%
Residential -48% -67% -81% -85%
Electricity -20% -90% -100% -85%
Total -43% -48% -65% -69%
Total compared to 1990 -36% -59% -73% -75%
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order to leave enough time for the firms in the 
construction sector for restructuring and training 
to be able to face this vast national action plan.
Refurbishment obligation schedule
G F e d c
social  
housing
2016 2016 2016 2020 2020
collective 
dwellings
2020 2024 2024 2028 2032
Individual 
houses
2018 2022 2026 2030 2034
The total number of refurbishments remains below 
200.000 until 2020. After 2020, this number gra-
dually increases until 2040 with 900.000 reno-
vations a year. Thereafter, the number of annual 
renovations declines. At the end of the period, 16.1 
million of buildings are retrofitted. 
With  these  additional measures,  emissions 
reductions reach the Factor Four.
With the additional measures, the emissions re-
duction pathway is lower than both Factor Four 
pathways (-20% in 2020 or -30% in 2020). This 
precocious abatement to achieve Factor Four 
pleads for early action as way to ensure that emis-
sions reductions at the end of the period follow the 
prescribed pathway. In addition, this leads to lower 
cumulated emissions, which results in a slightly 
lighter environmental impact.
Sectoral emissions reach a very low level. In the 
residential sector, emissions are divided by 6.6, 
thanks to the refurbishment obligation. Transport 
and production sectors reduce their emissions by 
two thirds. The power sector is totally decarbonized 
in 2040, but emissions increase again until 2050 
because gas is used to fill the gap between the elec-
tricity demand and the development of renewable 
energies and residual nuclear production. We find 
results similar to those of chapter 3 concerning 
sectors with the highest emission reductions and 
most challenging sectors to decarbonize.
From a macroeconomic point of view, the average 
economic growth in the Additional Measures Sce-
nario (AMS) is slightly inferior to the reference 
scenario whatever the option for the CET recycling. 
Nevertheless, until 2030, additional measures have 
positive economic impacts particularly because 
of energy efficiency measures which reduce the 
energy expenditures of households.
These GDP trends are directly linked to the evolu-
tion of the unemployment rate (compared to the 
reference scenario). Whatever the tax recycling 
option, the impact on unemployment is positive 
compared to the reference scenario. The maximum 
reduction of the unemployment rate occurs around 
2030, but the unemployment rate decreases as 
soon as 2020. The recycling of the CET for lowe-
ring payroll taxes has the most positive impact on 
employment over the whole period.
In this AMS scenario, the analysis of the house-
holds’ energy expenditures can prove very inte-
resting. Overall households’ energy expenditures 
decrease slightly (-1%) as soon as 2020 compared 
to the reference scenario. The decrease reaches 
5% in 2030 and the households’ energy expendi-
tures display a very important decrease between 
2030 and 2050, stabilizing at a level 28% lower 
than the reference. The share of the mentioned 
costs (total energy budget share for households) is 
18.4% in 2010, 15.8% in 2050 in the reference and 
11.3% in 2050 in the Factor Four scenario.
Conflicting trends are hidden behind this apparent 
regular decrease in expenditures. Gasoline expendi-
tures decrease throughout the period, accounting 
for improvements in cars energy efficiency and 
modal switch towards public transportation, with a 
transition speed much faster than in the reference. 
The share of other transport modes in the energy 
expenditures increases by 20% in 2030 to fall back 
to an identical level in 2050. Regarding residential 
energy, most of the effort is done between 2020 
and 2030 where the share drops much faster than 
in the reference. As a result of the refurbishment 
obligation the share of construction and refurbish-
ment in 2030 soars compared to the reference, 
as it is multiplied by 2.7. As said previously, these 
opposing tendencies still result in a very important 
decrease, which seems to be a precondition to a 
very ambitious mitigation plan.
Average annual Gdp growth rate
2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2050 2010-2050
Reference scenario 1.19 1.29 1.23 1.24
Additional  
measures  
scenario
Transfer  
to households
1.27 1.41 1.06 1.20
Payroll taxes 1.29 1.41 1.06 1.21
Energy Efficiency 
And renewables
1.27 1.41 1.06 1.20
unemployment rate/Ref. sc.
2020 2030 2040
Additional  
measures  
scenario
Transfer  
to households
-0.2% -1.9% -1.0%
Payroll taxes -1.3% -3.1% -2.4%
Energy Efficiency 
And renewables
-0.2% -1.9% -1.0%
expenditure share / Reference scenario 2020 2030 2050
Construction and refurbishment 156% 262% 67%
Gasoline -17% -32% -49%
Residential energy -15% -32% -36%
Other transports 10% 19% 1%
Total energy budget share -1% -5% -28%
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Sensitivity analysis 5
I. sensitivity analysis description
emission reductions in the scenario implemen-ting the measures considered as acceptable by 
stakeholders depend on many assumptions, par-
ticularly concerning technological change as well 
as the availability and acceptance of technologies. 
Therefore, we undertake a sensitivity analysis on 
several parameters. We tested several parameters 
as described in table 1, namely the availability of 
carbon capture and storage, investment costs of 
new nuclear plants, and of the extension of exis-
ting nuclear plants lifetime, investment costs of 
renewable electricity plants, and the availability 
of biofuels. We considered here a “no biofuels” 
alternative scenario in which second generation 
biofuels never achieve economic and technical 
viability and first generation biofuels are banned 
because of their weak environmental performances 
and their impact on land use change. We conside-
red here the “expensive RNE” alternative scenario 
where the pace of cost decrease for renewables is 
half the pace of cost decrease assumed in chap-
ter 3 (meaning that it takes twice as long in the 
“expensive RNE” scenario to reach the same cost 
as in the original scenario).
For each of these five parameters, we tested the 
acceptable scenario with the most pessimistic 
option for that parameter. Moreover, an adverse 
scenario was tested where all the five parameters 
are set to the pessimistic case at the same time. 
In addition, an adverse scenario was tested based 
on the “Additional Measures Scenario” from the 
previous section. 
Table 1 presents the content of the modified para-
meters for the seven resulting scenarios, as well as 
the scenario nomenclature used in this section.
II. sensitivity analysis for the 
“acceptable scenario” 
table 2 presents the emissions impacts for the sensitivity analysis. The impossibility to rely on 
biofuels is the variant with the largest impact on 
emission reductions in the short-term as well as in 
the long-term. Other parameters taken one by one 
have only a limited impact on emission reductions. 
Nevertheless, when these parameters are combi-
ned, long-term emissions only decrease by 53% 
in 2050 compared to 1990, thus not achieving the 
aimed “Factor Four”. It is noteworthy that short-
term reductions (i.e. in 2020) do not fall below 
the “No Biofuels” scenario. Indeed, all the other 
parameters of the “Adverse Scenario” mainly 
impact the power sector, where the transition 
1 - sensitivity analysis parameters and scenarios nomenclature
  scenario name
ccs in the 
power sector
nuclear 
(epR) 
invest-
ment cost 
(€/kW)
cost of 
nuclear plant 
lifetime 
extension 
(€/kW)
Biofuels - 1st 
and 2nd gene-
ration
Renewables 
cost decrease 
between 2010 
and 2050
Default 
settings
Acceptable scenario available 2900 700 available - X%
AMS scenario available 2900 700 available - X%
Alternatives
No CCS unavailable 2900 700 available - X%
Expensive nuke available 4500 700 available - X%
Expensive extension available 2900 1400 available - X%
No biofuels available 2900 700 unavailable - X%
Expensive RNE available 2900 700 available - x/2%
Adverse scenario unavailable 4500 1400 unavailable - x/2%
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really starts after 2020 when the first nuclear 
reactors are decommissioned and the share of 
intermittent renewables becomes significant. In 
this case, the measures considered as acceptable 
by stakeholders are not ambitious enough, even 
if emission reductions are significant in 2020.
Electricity prices increase in the short-term in 
all scenarios. The most influential parameter is 
the cost of new nuclear power plants. Indeed, 
increasing the investment costs by 55% leads to 
a 6% increase of electricity prices in the short 
term and to an increase of 11% in the long term 
compared to the “acceptable scenario”. The una-
vailability of CCS, as well as the unavailability of 
biofuels, induces a 3% increase in prices in the 
short term because these technologies reduce 
emissions, but slightly decrease the electricity 
price in the long-run as they avoid a lock-in in car-
bon-emitting technologies. The pessimistic case 
for renewables investment cost (respectively the 
extension of nuclear power plants) has no effect 
in the short run and induce a 5% (respectively 
6%) price increase in the long run. Finally, the 
“Adverse Scenario” leads to an increase of the 
electricity prices 8% in the short term and 21% 
in the long run, compared to the acceptable sce-
nario presented in section 3.
Macroeconomic impacts such as economic 
growth, unemployment and energy related 
expenditures for households are limited, but 
negative (see table 2). The most influential para-
meters are the unavailability of biofuels and the 
investment costs for new nuclear power plants. 
However, short-term impacts are very limited in 
the “Adverse Scenario” which is the most pes-
2 -  sensitivity analysis for the ”acceptable scenario“ described in chapter 3  
emissions, electricity prices and macroeconomics impacts
emission  
reductions  
compared to 1990
electricity 
price (€/MWh)
Gdp  
(/Mitigation)
unemployment 
rate  
(/Mitigation)
Household energy 
related expenditures 
(/Mitigation)
2020 2050 2030 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050
Acceptable scenario -31% -68% 1081 1100 - - - - - -
no ccs -32% -67% 1110 1077 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% -0.3%
expensive nuke -33% -65% 1151 1217 0.1% -1.1% -0.1% 0.8% -0.4% 2.7%
expensive extension -31% -67% 1090 1153 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6%
no Biofuels -28% -61% 1109 1087 -0.2% -1.2% 0.3% 1.2% 0.3% 0.4%
expensive Rne -31% -66% 1085 1163 0.0% -0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.9%
Adverse scenario -28% -53% 1169 1332 -0.2% -2.3% 0.2% 2.4% 0.4% 4.3%
simistic one (inferior to 1% in 2020 compared 
to the acceptable scenario). In the long run, the 
increase in the electricity price leads to a 4.3% 
increase in energy-related expenditures for 
households in the “Adverse Scenario”.
The impact on investments in the power sector 
is however very contrasted. Higher costs of new 
nuclear plants considerably decrease their share 
in the energy mix. They are replaced mainly by 
gas power plants. With the low level of the carbon 
tax at the beginning of the period, only half of 
the additional investment is with CCS. On the 
contrary, the unavailability of CCS technologies 
induces a shift towards new nuclear and gas 
without CCS. It is interesting to note that most 
scenarios rely on gas without CCS to a certain 
extent, at least as a transition technology.
The impacts of the other investigated sources of 
uncertainties are much more limited. The total 
amount of capacity is almost stable, showing that 
electricity becomes increasingly important as an 
energy carrier. However, any of the pessimistic 
assumptions leads to an increase in price (at 
least temporary) compared to the acceptable 
scenario, inducing a lower demand for electricity, 
which decreases the profitability of investment, 
hence reducing actual investments (even if by a 
small amount).
In the “Adverse Scenario”, the high cost of 
nuclear and the unavailability of CCS induce a 
massive shift toward gas power plants without 
CCS. However, only 10.4 GW of gas power plants 
are built against the missing 18.6 GW of nuclear 
and gas with CCS. Indeed, another impact is the 
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Gas without ccs
Gas with 
ccs
new nuclear coal with ccs oil total
Acceptable scenario 14.4 7.2 22.82 2.22 7.2 53.84
no ccs 16.8 (2.4) 0 (-7.2) 27.7 (4.9) 0 (-2.2) 7.2 (0) 51.7 (-2.1)
expensive nuke 19.2 (4.8) 12.8 (5.6) 8.1 (-14.6) 4.4 (2.2) 7.2 (0) 51.7 (-2)
expensive extension 14.4 (0) 7.2 (0) 21.1 (-1.6) 2.2 (0) 7.2 (0) 52.2 (-1.6)
no Biofuels 16.8 (2.4) 6.4 (-0.8) 24.4 (1.7) 0.7 (-1.5) 7.2 (0) 55.5 (1.8)
expensive Rne 14.4 (0) 7.2 (0) 21.1 (-1.6) 2.2 (0) 7.2 (0) 52.2 (-1.6)
Adverse scenario 24.8 (10.4) 0 (-7.2) 11.4 (-11.4) 0 (-2.2) 9.6 (2.4) 45.8 (-8)
3 -  sensitivity analysis for the “acceptable scenario” on investment in the power sector 
cumulated investment between 2010 and 2050 (GW)
decrease in cumulated investments in the power 
sector (-16%) because of the electricity price 
increase in this scenario.
III. sensitivity analysis for the 
Additional Measures scenario
We also explore the aggregated impact of these 
parameters on the additional measures scenario 
(described in section 4).
The impact on emissions reductions is signi-
ficant but smaller compared to the impact on 
the “acceptable” scenario (7 points of emissions 
reductions compared to 13 points in the previous 
sensitivity analysis). It is thus important to keep 
in mind that the implementation of additional 
measures leads to reduce by 50% the impact of 
uncertainties surrounding technology develop-
ment and their impact on emissions reductions. 
Macroeconomic impacts linked to unemployment, 
GDP growth and to household energy related 
expenditures are also smaller than for the “ac-
ceptable” scenario. This is partly explained by the 
smaller impact of uncertainties on investments 
in the power sector in the Additional Measures 
Scenario due to the reduced need for additional 
investments in electricity production capacities, 
with the exception of renewable energy.
The Additional Measure Scenario is thus more 
robust to uncertainties. 
4 -  sensitivity analysis for the “additional measures scenario” - emissions, electricity prices  
and macroeconomics impacts
5 -  sensitivity analysis for the “additional measures scenario” on investment in the power  
sector – cumulated investment between 2010 and 2050 (GW)
emission  
reductions  
compared to 
1990
electricity 
price (€/MWh)
Gdp (/AMs)
unemployment 
rate (/AMs)
Household 
energy related 
expenditures  
(/AMs)
2020 2050 2030 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050 2020 2050
AMs -44% -75% 1179 1600 - - - - - -
Adverse AMs scenario -40% -68% 1192 1503 -0.2% -1.6% 0.3% 1.5% 0.3% -0.1%
Gas without 
ccs
Gas with ccs
new 
nuclear
coal with 
ccs
oil total
AMs 14.4 2.4 0 0 2.4 19.2
Adverse AMs 
scenario
14.4 2.4 0 0 4.8 21.6
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Conclusion
the outcome of the collaborative scenario crea-tion attempt of the ENCI-LowCarb project is 
threefold. First, we designed and introduced a 
methodology for collaborative scenario creation. 
Second, we successfully applied this methodology 
to design a scenario which integrates the visions and 
contributions of a variety of stakeholders. Finally, 
the analysis of the energy scenario resulting from 
this process opened up a fruitful discussion on the 
transition as well as on the necessary and acceptable 
steps to face the urging climate challenge.
The emissions reductions following the implementa-
tion of all the measures that were judged acceptable 
by at least half of the stakeholders come close but 
fail in reaching the Factor Four target. In 2020, the 
mitigation scenario leads to CO2 emissions 33% 
lower than 1990, which is more ambitious than the 
20% European objective. However, the package of 
measures leads to a 68% CO2 emissions reduction 
only in 2050 compared to 1990. Nonetheless, the 
Factor Four is reached in the residential sector as 
well as in the power sector. The crucial issues lie 
with the contributions of the transport sector and 
of the productive sectors to tackle emissions. In 
the transport sector, the evolution of emissions 
will heavily depend on mobility, strongly driven 
by urban sprawl. The predominance of road for 
transportation and the yearning for more mobi-
lity, intertwined with the transformation of urban 
patterns in France will determine the shape of the 
energy transition. Besides, the emissions level in the 
productive sectors will be contingent upon the rela-
tive prices of gas and electricity and the speed of 
technical change. This mutation might significantly 
affect economic performance, calling for a national 
debate on the role of globalization.
This scenario does not represent a paradigm shift 
in the development pattern. Indeed, GDP per capi-
ta is projected to increase by 41% between 2010 
and 2050, and consumption is not reduced but 
redirected towards less energy-intensive products 
and services. Climate policy measures, especially 
through higher fossil energy prices, promote the 
development of low-carbon technologies and en-
ergy demand reduction, which contribute to redu-
cing the overall energy bill and the energy budget 
of households. In addition, these policy measures 
alleviate the economic detrimental consequences 
of the rise of fossil fuels prices. Also investing in 
energy efficiency drives GDP growth and reduces 
unemployment. The trigger for this evolution is 
the implementation of a carbon tax to redirect 
investments towards less carbon-intensive options 
by increasing the cost of fossil fuels. A low carbon 
transition cannot be initiated without this crucial 
leverage, which is supported by a majority of the 
contributing stakeholders.
This project has revealed elements of consensus 
regarding climate mitigation policies but also some 
cleavages. Two measures that were not consen-
sual among stakeholders appear crucial in actually 
reaching the Factor Four objective: the refurbish-
ment obligation for the existing building stock and 
the energy-carbon tax (instead of a carbon tax only). 
The implementation of these two measures limit the 
growth of energy demand and thereby decrease the 
dependency of emissions reductions on technical 
progress and low-carbon technologies availability. 
This report reveals the need for a strong political 
commitment to leverage the decarbonization of 
the energy system. The responsibility lies with the 
stakeholders and the government to decide on a 
hierarchy of values and actions fed by scientific 
evidence and public concerns. The question of the 
precedence of long-term interests (e.g. protecting 
the needs of future generations) over short-term 
considerations is an ethical issue, which should be 
subjected to public scrutiny. In any case, scientific 
evidence shows today that urgent and far-reaching 
action is necessary. 
This project shows that a consensus about the 
acceptability of ambitious measures cannot be 
easily found among stakeholders, especially if 
their activity is directly impacted. However, it is 
the responsibility of the government to act as a 
mediator to implement the measures that are nee-
ded to achieve climate objectives and to define the 
required compensations to overcome the identified 
cleavages. 
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72020 2030 2040 2050
Industry -33% -37% -59% -57%
Manufacture and services -36% -39% -49% -49%
Agriculture -24% -30% -42% -40%
transport -19% -35% -55% -60%
Residential -44% -62% -72% -75%
electricity 49% -68% -100% -86%
total -15% -39% -59% -60%
total (compared to 1990) -31% -50% -67% -68%
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
tRAnspoRt
Heavy trucks eco-tax 0 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.2
Kerosene tax 0 1.6 1.1 1.4 1.3
Impact on domestic consumption tax 
on petroleum products
23.8 21.4 17.9 13.4 12.9
InFRAstRuctuRe InVestMents
urban transports +3 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030 - -
Railways +3 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030 - -
Road transports -6 billion € each year from 2012 until 2030 - -
electRIcIty
cspe Income = feed-in tariffs expense 2.9 1.9 7.2 17.8 12.7
ResIdentIAl sectoR
tax credit - -3.3 -2.5 -0.8 -0.5
eco-loan - -3.3 -1.9 -0.6 -0.4
construction - -9.5 -9.4 -7.7 -6.3
Refurbishment - -14.9 -10.3 -3 -1.8
oVeRAll MeAsuRes
carbon tax 0 13.7 18.1 23.9 34.8
totAl 26.7 8.9 21.3 45.5 53.9
Summary tables  
of the acceptable mitigation scenario
policies and measures financial balance (mitigation scenario) in bn €
co2 sectoral emissions compared to 2010 (mitigation scenario)
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Residential 
sector
tax credits: The purchase of refurbishment equipments is eligible to income tax credits. Increased rates and an 
extended eligibility base are modeled from 2009 until 2050 through a uniform tax rebate of 30% of the investment.
Zero-interest loans for retrofitting actions: 0% interest rates apply for retrofit packages with a maximum amount 
at 30,000€ per dwelling. The credit duration period is about 10 - 15 years.
thermal regulation for new buildings: From 2012 maximum primary energy consumption level: 50 kWh/m2/year  
of primary energy. After 2020: new buildings have to be net producers of energy.
Implicit representation of obligatory renovation funds for jointly-owned buildings and of the availability  
of third-party financing which reduces the risk aversion of the agents.
Biogas: The biogas penetrates gradually between 2012 and 2050. Its share reaches 17% in the gas in 2050.
urban planning: Economic incentives and regulations slow down urban sprawl until 2030. After 2030 urban density 
increases again.
urban transports investment program: Investments in urban transports (buses, tramways) are doubled during  
15 years from 2012.
teleworking: one day of work out of ten.
Vehicles occupation rate: increase of the cars occupation rate for urban transport from 1.25 to 1.5.
Kerosene tax: A tax on kerosene consumption for air transport is introduced in 2012. It represents 400€/toe.
Heavy truck environmental tax: an eco-tax on the liquid fuel consumption of heavy trucks is introduced in 2012.  
It is calibrated to bring in 1.2 billion € in 2012.
Rail investment program: Investments in road infrastructures are limited to maintenance of infrastructures. Invest-
ments are shifted from road to rail for 20 years.
All collective transports investments are deducted to the road infrastructures investments.
Bonus-malus: is extended until 2050. A positive annual financial balance for the government budget or at least close 
to 0 is obtained.
logistics: annual decoupling of freight transport needs of 1% for all sectors.
Infrastructures: the modal share of rail transport in freight reaches only 20% in 2030 (exogenous assumption).
Biofuels: Biofuels penetrate following the biofuel development scenario in the “World Energy Outlook 2006”. 
Production is about 5 Mtoe in 2020 and 16 Mtoe in 2050 (respectively 9% and 39% of total refined petroleum 
products).
electricity
expectations: The electricity sector is assumed to receive clear carbon tax signals and expects the exact value of the 
carbon tax for the whole period.
existing nuclear plants lifetime extensions: 40 GW out of 63 GW have their lifetime extended for 20 years  
for 0.7 bn€/GW.
Feed-in tariffs: Feed-in tariffs for renewable energies are economic incentives to facilitate the market penetration of 
these technologies and to accelerate the learning effect. Feed-in tariffs normally decrease over time and end when the 
technologies achieve price competitiveness with other technologies.
demand side management: implicit measures (interruptible contracts, smart metering) are used to flatten the load 
demand curve.
Interdiction of electric heating: Electric heating is not globally banned but the implementation of the thermal  
regulation up from 2012 de facto excludes electric heating (exception heat pumps).
Grid construction: The construction of renewables triggers additional transmission grid investments, thus increasing  
the electricity price for 3€/MWh in the mitigation scenario (the distribution grid was omitted but should induce a 
comparable spending).
overall 
policy  
measures
carbon tax: 32€/tCO2 in 2012, 56€/tCO2 in 2020, 100€/tCO2 in 2030, to 200€/tCO2 in 2040 and to 300€/tCO2  
in 2050.
progressive tariff: For all households, any consumption above 60 kWh/m2 is more expensive: 5% after 2014  
and of 10% after 2030.
carbon tax recycling: The carbon tax income is recycled in a lump sum towards households (each person  
receives an equal share of the total perceived amount).
Acceptable policy measures in the mitigation scenario
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primary and final energy in the mitigation scenario (Mtoe)
2010 2030 2050
pRIMARy eneRGy MIx
Total primary energy 234 178 166
Biogas - 2 3
Liquid biofuels - 8 16
Coal 11 6 6
Electricity - nuclear 91 71 58
Electricity - renewables 10 18 28
Gas 40 23 15
Oil 82 50 40
Wood - 3 3
FInAl eneRGy MIx
Final energy 152 130 126
Biogas - 2 3
Liquid biofuels - 8 16
Coal 6 4 3
Electricity 46 46 52
Gas 34 15 11
Oil 66 50 39
Wood - 3 3
note: in this table, 
primary energy for 
biomass (biogas, biofuels 
and wood) equals 
final energy since the 
Imaclim-R France model 
does not represent the 
energy transformation for 
these energies (but only 
the economic flows).
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